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Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of  
Institutional Reform Litigation 
Jason Parkin* 
Institutional reform litigation has been an enduring feature of the 
American legal system since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of 
Education. The resulting injunctions have transformed countless 
bureaucracies notorious for resisting change, including public school systems, 
housing authorities, social services agencies, correctional facilities, and police 
departments. But these injunctions face an uncertain future. The Supreme 
Court has held that institutional reform injunctions must be easier to 
terminate than all other injunctions issued by the federal courts. Some 
institutional reform injunctions go unenforced or are forgotten entirely. Others 
expire due to sunset provisions. At the same time, doctrinal shifts have made it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to win new injunctions in institutional reform 
cases. 
Scholars have been tracing the decline of institutional reform 
litigation for years, but little attention has been paid to the fate of the 
countless injunctions that remain in place. This Article sheds light on this 
essential but overlooked aspect of institutional reform litigation. First, it 
identifies three ways that institutional reform injunctions are dying off—by 
dissolution, by design, and by disuse—and the implications of each form of 
injunction death. Then, it argues that scholars, judges, and litigants must 
rethink their approach to the end stages of institutional reform injunctions, 
offering strategies to ensure that current and future injunctions are not 
terminated prematurely. This Article thus adds an important new perspective 
to the debate over the legacy of institutional reform litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What will become of aging institutional reform injunctions? 
Sixty years have now passed since the Supreme Court first endorsed 
the notion that courts could order system-wide reforms intended to 
bring government agencies into compliance with the law.1 During that 
time, institutional reform litigation has transformed countless 
bureaucracies notorious for resisting change, including public school 
systems, social services agencies, correctional facilities, housing 
authorities, and police departments.2 The injunctions that result from 
 
 1.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). 
 2.  See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1021–52 (2004) (tracing the history of institutional 
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these lawsuits comprise a body of binding, enforceable obligations that 
supplement the rights and requirements created by constitutional, 
statutory, and regulatory law. As time passes, however, how long 
these injunctions will remain in force is far from clear. 
Although institutional reform litigation has been the subject of 
much legal scholarship, comparatively little attention has been paid to 
how its remedial phase should come to an end. As this novel form of 
litigation rose to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, it sparked 
heated debates among scholars. The cases were controversial from the 
beginning, as they involved judges (usually federal) compelling 
government agencies (usually state and local) to honor the rights 
(usually federal) of individuals who interact with those agencies. Its 
proponents viewed institutional reform litigation as an important tool 
for ensuring that governmental entities comply with the law,3 while 
critics objected on federalism, separation of powers, and judicial 
legitimacy and capacity grounds.4 More recently, public law scholars 
have shifted their focus to the increasingly hostile terrain facing 
plaintiffs bringing new lawsuits challenging governmental policies 
and practices. Aside from law review articles commenting on the 
winding down of school desegregation remedies,5 the fate of existing 
institutional reform injunctions has been largely ignored.6 
 
reform remedies, with particular attention to litigation involving education, mental health 
services, prisons, police, and housing). 
 3.  Leading scholars such as Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss provided crucial early support. 
See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice]; OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
INJUNCTION (1978) [hereinafter FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION]. Their work, as well as the 
work of other proponents of institutional reform litigation, is discussed in Part I, infra. 
 4.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 19; William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies 
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational 
Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265; Michael W. 
McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political 
Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295; Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of 
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978).  
 For more contemporary critiques of institutional reform litigation, see, for example, ROSS 
SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN 
GOVERNMENT (2003) [hereinafter SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE]; Michael T. 
Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems with Consent 
Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637 (2014); Ross Sandler & David 
Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy and Institutional Reform Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 915 (2005) [hereinafter Sandler & Schoenbrod, Supreme Court]; and John Choon Yoo, 
Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1121 (1996). 
 5.  See, e.g., David I. Levine, The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The 
Course of Institutional Reform Cases After Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
          
170 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:167 
Unlike academics, the litigants and judges involved with 
institutional reform litigation do not have the luxury of ignoring 
questions related to the end stages of these injunctions. Although the 
Supreme Court has rarely addressed when and how institutional 
reform injunctions should conclude, its most recent ruling on this 
topic—the 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores—emphasized that 
institutional reform injunctions must be easier to terminate than all 
other types of injunctions.7 In response, government defendants have 
moved aggressively to overturn or dissolve long-standing injunctions.8 
This has altered the dynamic of institutional reform litigation in 
recent years, as previously victorious plaintiffs are finding themselves 
on the defensive, fighting to preserve remedies won at earlier stages of 
the litigation.9 
But government motions to terminate injunctions represent 
only part of the story when it comes to the death of institutional 
reform injunctions. The remedies are also coming to an end in two less 
visible—but no less important—ways. First, institutional reform 
injunctions are terminating according to their own design.10 An 
institutional reform injunction can be written so that it applies in 
perpetuity, or it can specify the terms of its demise in a termination or 
“sunset” provision. Such provisions are typically triggered by the 
passage of a specified period of time or by the defendant’s satisfaction 
of performance benchmarks. Whether bargained for by parties as part 
of a consent decree or inserted by judges fashioning a litigated 
remedial order, these provisions have become common as defendants 
and judges seek to avoid long-term court oversight and enforcement of 
institutional reform injunctions. 
Second, institutional reform injunctions are terminating due to 
disuse.11 Even when institutional reform injunctions are in effect on 
paper, they remain viable only as long as the parties and the court 
 
579 (1993); Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of 
Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283 (2002). 
 6.  Two recent exceptions do not address the broader issues considered by this Article. See 
Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Future 
of Institutional Reform Litigation After Horne v. Flores, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1435 (2013); Mark 
Kelley, Note, Saving 60(b)(5): The Future of Institutional Reform Litigation, 125 YALE L.J. 272 
(2015). 
 7.  557 U.S. 433 (2009). The Horne decision relied, in part, on earlier Supreme Court 
rulings that expressed growing skepticism of institutional reform litigation. See Frew v. 
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); Bd. of 
Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 8.  See infra Part II.A. 
 9.  See infra Part II.A. 
 10.  See infra Part II.B. 
 11.  See infra Part II.C. 
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continue to implement and enforce them. For injunctions issued five, 
ten, twenty, thirty, or even forty years ago, this can be quite a difficult 
task. The plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and judges involved in the 
litigation all must exit the case eventually (whether because of 
relocation, retirement, death, or other reasons), creating a need for 
new participants to ensure that the injunction is not ignored or 
forgotten. In addition, the circumstances of the underlying legal 
violations may evolve over time in ways that create a mismatch 
between the terms of the injunction and the problem it was intended 
to remedy. These changes do not necessarily mean that aging 
injunctions should be discarded; to the contrary, the proper response 
may be to update rather than cast aside the injunction. But when an 
injunction falls into disuse, for whatever reason, it may effectively 
terminate even though the injunction otherwise remains a valid court 
order. 
Taken together, these three forms of injunction death—by 
dissolution, by design, and by disuse—show that the end stage of 
institutional reform litigation is more complex and less visible than 
suggested by court decisions and law review articles. Litigated 
injunctions are not as permanent as they once seemed—even when 
they are labeled “permanent injunctions” by the court. Similarly, the 
stability of consent decrees negotiated by plaintiffs and defendants, 
and overseen by judges, is also in doubt, either because defendants are 
demanding the inclusion of sunset provisions or they are filing 
motions to terminate the decrees. In sum, regardless of the cause, the 
lifespan of institutional reform injunctions is shortening in ways that 
have escaped attention thus far. 
This shift has important implications for the plaintiffs, 
defendants, lawyers, and judges involved in institutional reform 
litigation. Termination of an institutional reform injunction threatens 
to result in rights violations that go unaddressed. This could occur 
because the injunction ends before the defendant has fully remedied 
the underlying unlawful activity, or because violations that had 
ceased begin again after the injunction is dissolved. To be sure, such 
undesirable outcomes are not automatic; however, the shift toward 
earlier termination of institutional reform injunctions increases the 
likelihood that an injunction will be terminated before its objectives 
have been met. 
Sooner-than-expected termination can also upset the 
expectations of the parties and judges who designed the injunctions. 
Effective institutional reform takes time, and institutional reform 
injunctions often call for remedial measures and performance 
improvements that require years, if not decades, to be achieved. 
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Particularly for older injunctions, it is likely that the drafters assumed 
that the injunctions would remain in force for many years. But now, 
with the lifespan of injunctions shortening, those injunctions may not 
last long enough for their provisions to be implemented as intended. 
Reducing the duration of injunctions also adds uncertainty and 
cost to the process of institutional reform. At the most basic level, it 
undermines one of the goals of institutional reform injunctions: to 
create a stable set of requirements and expectations for government 
institutions that have failed to comply with the law. But if the 
requirements and expectations established by an injunction are 
perceived to be merely temporary, true systemic reform is harder to 
achieve. The perception that institutional reform injunctions are 
susceptible to termination can also consume litigation and judicial 
resources, with parties litigating, and courts ruling on, more frequent 
motions to terminate injunctions as well as new lawsuits challenging 
violations that were targeted by injunctions that have been 
terminated. 
When considering the fate of aging institutional reform 
injunctions, it is important to note that just because an injunction has 
been in place for years without full compliance does not necessarily 
mean that it is outdated or ineffectual. Long-standing injunctions can 
be the source of ongoing, vigorous monitoring and enforcement efforts 
aimed at bringing a recalcitrant defendant into compliance with the 
law. Decades-old injunctions aimed at reforming New York City’s 
public schools12 and New Jersey’s child welfare system provide two 
examples.13 Those injunctions went into effect in 1979 and 2003, 
respectively, and they continue to influence the day-to-day operation 
of vital government agencies. 
But even injunctions that have prompted the intended reforms 
are not necessarily ready for the scrap heap. A vivid illustration is 
provided by the Flores v. Reno consent decree, which established 
minimum standards for the treatment of minor children in the custody 
of immigration officials.14 The district court approved the consent 
 
 12.  See Judgment, Jose P. v. Ambach, No. 79 Civ. 270 (EHN) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1979). This 
injunction has been modified and supplemented since 1979. See, e.g., Stipulation, Jose P. v. 
Sobol, No. 79 Civ. 270 (EHN) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1988).  
 13.  See Settlement Agreement, Charlie & Nadine H. v. McGreevey, Civ. Action No. 99-3678 
(SRC) (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2003). This injunction was modified in 2008. Modified Settlement 
Agreement, Charlie & Nadine H. v. Corzine, Civ. Action No. 99-3678 (SRC) (D.N.J. July 18, 
2006). 
 14.  See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 17, 1997). The lawsuit was initially filed as Flores v. Meese, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) 
(C.D. Cal. July 11, 1985), but Attorney General Janet Reno had been substituted as the lead 
defendant by the time it settled. 
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decree in 1997, and the government complied with its terms for many 
years. Although there were times when it appeared to be just another 
old injunction that had outlived its purpose and fallen into disuse, the 
Flores decree has been called into action twice during its lifespan.15 In 
2007, a group of children challenged their confinement in a Texas 
facility that failed to comply with the consent decree’s terms,16 and, in 
2015, the Flores class returned to court to enforce the decree on behalf 
of children detained after fleeing violence in Central America.17 Both 
actions were resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor, with the government 
agreeing or being ordered to adjust its policies in accordance with the 
original Flores consent decree.18 
As these and other examples demonstrate, the story of 
institutional reform litigation is incomplete without an accounting of 
how institutional reform injunctions come to an end. Yet while this is 
becoming increasingly apparent as more injunctions are terminated, it 
has been obscured by other shifts in the doctrinal landscape occupied 
by institutional reform litigation. Recent Supreme Court decisions 
related to standing, class-action standards, private rights of action, 
and the scope of injunctions, all make it harder for plaintiffs seeking 
institutional reform to win system-wide relief.19 While important, 
those developments affect the ability of new plaintiffs to obtain new 
injunctions. The future of institutional reform litigation surely will 
depend on what happens in lawsuits that have not yet been brought—
but the fate of countless existing injunctions is an essential part of 
that future as well. 
Considering the end stages of institutional reform injunctions 
raises difficult normative questions. It can be tempting to adopt 
across-the-board rules limiting the lifespan of these injunctions to a 
 
 15.  A 2001 amendment to the consent decree added a termination provision, but the 
conditions of that provision have not been satisfied and the decree remains in force. Stipulation 
and Order, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2001) (“All terms of this 
agreement shall terminate 45 days following defendants’ publication of final regulations 
implementing this Agreement.”). 
 16.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, In re Hutto Family Detention Ctr., No. 
A-07-CA-164-SS (W.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2007). 
 17.  See Motion to Enforce Settlement of Class Action, Flores v. Johnson, No. CV 85-4544 
RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2015). 
 18.  Settlement Agreement, In re Hutto Family Detention Ctr., No. A-07-CA-164-SS (W.D. 
Tex. Aug. 26, 2007); Flores v. Johnson, No. CV 85-4544 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) 
(granting plaintiffs’ motion to enforce settlement and denying defendants’ motion to amend 
settlement agreement), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th 
Cir. 2016). The government’s compliance with the most recent Flores remedial order is in 
dispute. See Motion to Enforce Settlement and Appoint a Special Monitor, Flores v. Lynch, No. 
CV 85-4544 DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2016). 
 19.  See infra notes 110–118 and accompanying text. 
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specified period of time. Indeed, Congress enacted such temporal 
limitations in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), 
which mandates that injunctions in prison-conditions lawsuits 
terminate within two years unless the court makes certain findings.20 
And, more recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed bills 
seeking to extend similar limitations to all consent decrees that bind 
state and local government officials.21 This Article questions whether 
such bright-line limitations are desirable in the institutional reform 
litigation context. It looks instead for approaches that link the 
duration of injunctions to the government’s ability to remedy the 
underlying violations. 
The tension between permanent and temporary legal 
obligations is not limited to institutional reform litigation. Federal 
legislation offers one useful comparison. Congress generally passes 
two types of laws: laws that remain valid unless and until a future 
Congress repeals them, and explicitly short-term laws, such as 
appropriations bills and bills with sunset provisions,22 that are valid 
only for a limited period of time. These are roughly analogous to 
permanent and temporary injunctions issued by courts. However, 
when statutes are subject to expiration, the conditions are discussed 
and debated up front, and the costs are internalized by the political 
process. Long-standing institutional reform injunctions, in contrast, 
can be subject to early termination without up-front bargaining over 
the conditions of termination. 
Despite raising concerns about the premature termination of 
institutional reform injunctions, this Article does not argue that the 
injunctions must remain in effect indefinitely. There will surely be 
instances in which a government defendant can demonstrate that it 
 
 20.  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1367–68 
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2012)). 
 21.  Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, H.R. 3041, 112th Cong. (2011). The proposed 
legislation would mandate that state and local government officials be able to terminate consent 
decrees within four years of entry or upon the expiration of predecessor officials’ term in office, 
unless the court finds that the plaintiffs have “demonstrate[d] that the denial of the motion to 
modify or terminate the consent decree or any part of the consent decree is necessary to prevent 
the violation of a requirement of Federal law that—(i) was actionable by such party; and (ii) was 
addressed in the consent decree.” Id. § 3. The bill was first introduced in 2005, and it was most 
recently reintroduced in 2011. 
 22.  See, e.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001) (establishing ten-year sunset provision for reductions in tax 
rates); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 110105(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 2000 (1994) (establishing ten-year sunset provision for federal ban 
on certain “assault weapons”). See generally Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make 
Me Democratic, but Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1975, 1982–85 (2015) (discussing “sunset lawmaking”). 
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has implemented effective and durable reforms. In other cases, the 
passage of time may bring about new facts and circumstances that 
make an existing injunction unnecessary or even nonsensical. 
This Article has two primary goals, one descriptive and one 
normative. First, it identifies the ways that existing institutional 
reform injunctions are dying off and the implications of each form of 
injunction death for institutional reform litigation. Second, based on 
this account of injunction termination, it argues that scholars, judges, 
and litigants must rethink their approach to the end stages of 
institutional reform injunctions, and it offers strategies to ensure that 
current and future institutional reform injunctions are not terminated 
prematurely. The Article thus injects a new perspective into the 
debate over the legacy of institutional reform litigation. 
Part I of this Article surveys the relatively short history of 
institutional reform injunctions as they have evolved since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown II. After introducing institutional 
reform litigation and the debate surrounding its rise to prominence, 
this Part focuses on the injunctions obtained by plaintiffs through this 
form of litigation. By highlighting the wide range of injunctions that 
remain in force today, this Part reveals the continuing importance of 
institutional reform litigation and the stakes involved when 
injunctions are terminated. It also identifies the relative lack of 
attention paid to the termination of institutional reform injunctions. 
Next, Part II examines the shrinking pool of aging institutional 
reform injunctions. It identifies and describes three different ways 
that institutional reform injunctions are coming to an end: by 
dissolution, by design, and by disuse. For each form of injunction 
death, this Part identifies the varying implications for the parties, 
lawyers, and judges involved in institutional reform litigation. 
Part III then explores how scholars, judges, and litigants 
should think about the termination of existing and future institutional 
reform injunctions. Drawing on the discussion in Part II, this Part 
begins by arguing that the current, seemingly haphazard approach to 
injunction termination should be reconsidered and replaced with an 
approach that takes as its touchstone the goals of the injunction. To 
that end, this Part then proposes strategies for improving and 
rationalizing how institutional reform injunctions come to an end now 
and in the future. The Article concludes by calling for renewed 
attention to the end stages of institutional reform injunctions so that 
the injunctions are not terminated prematurely. 
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I. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INJUNCTIONS 
For over sixty years, institutional reform litigation has 
influenced the operation of government institutions and agencies at 
the local, state, and federal levels. It has also been the subject of a 
significant amount of critical scrutiny, attracting the attention of 
judges, legislators, government officials, and scholars. Far from a 
static concept, institutional reform litigation has evolved since its 
earliest days, as the number of new lawsuits filed has declined and the 
scope and nature of the resulting remedies have narrowed. But 
institutional reform litigation is far from dead, and, more importantly 
for this Article, doctrinal and attitudinal shifts in the institutional 
reform litigation landscape are raising difficult questions concerning 
the lifespan of institutional reform injunctions. After first tracing the 
origin and defining features of institutional reform injunctions, this 
Part then examines the critical backlash against this type of remedy 
and the pool of injunctions that nonetheless remain in force. 
A. Novel Litigation Brings Novel Remedies 
Institutional reform litigation has been part of the American 
legal landscape for over sixty years. Whether referred to as 
“institutional reform litigation,” “structural reform litigation,” or 
“public law litigation,”23 this type of lawsuit seeks court-ordered 
injunctions24 aimed at reforming the day-to-day operation of 
government institutions that are accused of committing systemic 
violations of the law. This type of injunction dates back to the 
landmark Brown v. Board of Education litigation,25 and specifically 
the Supreme Court’s second ruling in the case.26 That decision, known 
 
 23.  See Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as 
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1995 (1999) (explaining that this type of litigation has been 
“termed, variously, ‘public law litigation,’ ‘structural reform litigation,’ or ‘institutional reform 
litigation’ ”). 
 24.  This Article uses the term “injunction” to refer to court orders that are the product of a 
litigated decree (i.e., an injunction that is designed and so-ordered by the judge), a consent decree 
or a settlement agreement (i.e., an injunction that is designed by the parties and so-ordered by 
the court), or similar relief. 
 25.  349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 26.  See, e.g., Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., Special Project, The Remedial Process in 
Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 788 n.9 (1978) (“The birth of modern 
institutional reform litigation can be traced to [Brown II] . . . .”); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra 
note 3, at 2 (“As a genre of constitutional litigation, structural reform has its roots in the Warren 
Court era and the extraordinary effort to translate the rule of Brown v. Board of Education into 
practice.” (citation omitted)); David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big 
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as Brown II, implicitly acknowledged that merely ordering a 
government agency to comply with its legal obligations—in that case, 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—may not 
be sufficient to eradicate the unlawful conduct. Rather, the Court 
instructed the district courts to fashion a remedy that would compel 
the defendant to take certain prescribed steps to ensure compliance 
with its constitutional mandates.27 
In the years since Brown II, institutional reform litigation has 
spread far beyond the context of school desegregation.28 Plaintiffs have 
brought lawsuits challenging the operation of a wide range of 
government institutions, including police departments,29 prisons and 
jails,30 school districts,31 child welfare and social services agencies,32 
mental health facilities,33 and public housing authorities,34 among 
 
Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1026 (2004) (referring to Brown II as “the 
case that began the institutional reform era”). 
 27.  See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (instructing the district courts “to take such proceedings 
and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to 
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties 
to these cases”); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the Supreme Court in 
Brown II “delegated the reconstructive task to the lower federal judges”); Margo Schlanger, Civil 
Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
550, 552 (2006) (“Brown II authorized district judges to assess the need for, order, and oversee 
sweeping changes not only to schools but to the full range of important governmental 
institutions.”). 
 28.  See, e.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 3–4 (noting that “in time, the lessons of 
school desegregation were transferred to other contexts”); Schlanger, supra note 23, at 1994–95 
(“[T]hrough implementation of Brown, the nation’s litigants, lawyers, and judges grew 
accustomed both to issuance of permanent injunctions against state and local public institutions, 
and to extended court oversight of compliance.”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and 
Police Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 94–95 & n.6 (2012). 
 30.  See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 13–17 (1998); Schlanger, supra 
note 23, at 2004 (discussing “a nationwide flood of class-action lawsuits leading to major court 
orders requiring reform in such areas as housing conditions, security, medical care, mental 
health care, sanitation, nutrition, and exercise”). 
 31.  See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely 
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 183, 192–207 (2003) (discussing institutional reform litigation challenging public 
school segregation and inequitable funding). 
 32.  See, e.g., SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS: CHILD WELFARE LITIGATION AND 
THE FEDERAL COURTS (2000) (exploring the role of litigation in reforming the child welfare 
system). 
 33.  See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed. 
1989) (examining mental disability law in the United States and how the courts have influenced 
this area). 
 34.  See, e.g., Joseph Seliga, Comment, Gautreaux a Generation Later: Remedying the 
Second Ghetto or Creating the Third?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1049 (2000) (examining the effects of 
institutional reform litigation on the public housing authority in Chicago). 
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others. Plaintiffs have sought to enforce their rights under the 
Constitution35 as well as a host of statutes and regulations.36 Although 
most of these cases have been litigated in federal court, state courts 
have provided a forum for institutional reform litigation as well.37 
It is difficult to offer a comprehensive definition of institutional 
reform litigation. Lawsuits challenging a governmental entity’s 
system-wide policies or practices can be brought by individuals as well 
as government officials acting in their enforcement capacity.38 The 
targeted institutions are typically creatures of state or local 
governments, but federal agencies can also be defendants in 
institutional reform litigation.39 Regardless of the identity of the 
plaintiffs or defendants, institutional reform lawsuits seek to bring to 
bear the remedial power of the courts—in the form of an injunction—
to force a government institution to change how it operates so that it 
honors the rights of the individuals it serves.40 
Just as there is no standard type of institutional reform 
lawsuit, there is also no standard type of institutional reform 
injunction. The Supreme Court, beginning with Brown II, has declined 
to specify what institutional reform remedies should look like.41 
Moreover, the injunctions can be the product of very different design 
 
 35.  For example, most institutional reform litigation targeting correctional facilities 
involves claims to enforce provisions of the Constitution. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 30. 
 36.  For example, most institutional reform litigation targeting public housing authorities 
involves claims to enforce federal statutes and regulations. See Seliga, supra note 34 (discussing 
litigation against the Chicago Housing Authority). 
 37.  See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO L.J. 1355, 
1358 (1991) (noting “what appears to be a growing docket of public law cases” in state courts). 
 38.  Although institutional reform plaintiffs are typically individuals or classes of 
individuals who are being harmed by the defendant’s unlawful policies or procedures, the federal 
government has also been an active plaintiff in institutional reform lawsuits. See, e.g., Stephen 
Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189 (2014) (discussing the 
Department of Justice’s use of litigation to prompt structural reform of police departments). 
 39.  See, e.g., Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997) (establishing minimum standards for the treatment of minor children in 
the custody of federal immigration officials). 
 40.  Institutional reform litigation “does not include all litigation involving institutions. For 
example, cases that do no more than address the constitutionality of a statutory scheme 
governing institutions should not be characterized as institutional litigation.” Theodore 
Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 468 (1980). 
 41.  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (instructing the district courts “to 
take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are 
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all 
deliberate speed the parties to these cases”). The Supreme Court’s reluctance to provide 
significant guidance is not surprising, as designing institutional reform injunctions is “one of the 
most difficult tasks in our system of government.” PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 3 
(1988). 
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processes: in cases in which a judge issues an injunction after ruling 
on the merits of a lawsuit (referred to as “litigated injunctions”), the 
judge typically designs an injunction setting forth what the defendant 
must do to comply with the law;42 in contrast, judges can have little or 
no role in the creation of injunctions that the parties design 
themselves and submit to the judge for approval (referred to as 
“consent decrees”).43 Institutional reform remedies may also emerge 
from hybrid processes in which, for example, a judge facilitates 
negotiations between the parties44 or designates a special master to 
help the parties formulate a remedy.45 Not surprisingly, the different 
ways in which they are designed introduces considerable variation 
among institutional reform injunctions. 
Institutional reform injunctions also differ with respect to their 
scope and level of detail. All institutional reform injunctions do more 
than merely order a defendant to comply with the law, but the 
specificity of the injunction’s directives varies from case to case (and 
sometimes as time goes on within a case).46 Some injunctions provide 
detailed instructions for the day-to-day operation of the institution,47 
 
 42.  See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 800–05 (discussing different ways that judges can 
dictate institutional reform remedies).  
 43.  See id. at 797–800 (discussing institutional reform injunctions formulated without the 
participation of the judge). Even where judges do not participate directly in the formulation of 
the remedy, “judges frequently do play a substantive role in encouraging and crafting complex 
settlements of all kinds, including consent decrees, both actively and indirectly through the 
parties’ surmises or knowledge about a judge’s substantive inclinations.” Schlanger, supra note 
23, at 2013; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (describing how, even in cases that 
settle without a ruling on the merits, judges “are a ghostly but influential presence, through 
their rulings in adjudicated cases and their anticipated response to the case at hand”); 
Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2013–14 (“Decrees develop out of the complex interplay of the 
judges’ promotion of settlement and the parties’ expectations as to the outcome of litigation and 
varying stakes and information.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 44.  See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 809–12 (discussing negotiated remedies); Susan 
Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. 
PA. L. REV. 805, 856 (1990) (arguing that judges in prison reform lawsuits should act as 
“catalyst[s]” who “create[ ] processes and incentives in order to induce the parties to participate 
in a deliberative process to formulate and implement an effective remedy”). 
 45.  See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 805–09 (discussing remedies formulated through 
a process supervised by a judge-appointed special master).  
 46.  For example, an injunction that initially gives a defendant broad discretion over how it 
reforms its policies and practices may, after a period of non-compliance, be revised to specify the 
particular actions that the defendant must take to remedy its unlawful actions.  
 47.  Highly detailed directives have advantages and disadvantages. See, e.g., Buckholz et 
al., supra note 26, at 844 (“Although detailed substantive provisions offer considerable 
advantages for monitoring compliance and for administration, they restrict the defendants in 
ways that may prove unreasonable in the long run.”); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 49–
50 (acknowledging that some observers find the detailed directives contained in structural 
reform injunctions to be “baffling,” but arguing that specific directives may be “necessary and 
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while others grant broad discretion to the government officials 
charged with running the institution.48 Similarly, depending in part 
on the legal claims at issue49 and whether the injunction was imposed 
by the court or agreed to by the parties,50 the scope of the injunction 
can be narrow or broad.51 The injunctions can also vary according to 
their monitoring, reporting, and enforcement provisions. 
Notwithstanding the diversity of institutional reform 
injunctions, the remedies generally rely on two necessary conditions to 
achieve their goals. First, the injunctions require a degree of flexibility 
in their implementation.52 When trying to spur systemic reforms 
within a public institution, it is nearly impossible to identify all of the 
 
appropriate . . . either as a way of minimizing the risk of evasion or as a way of helping the 
bureaucratic officers know what is expected of them”). 
 48.  See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1082–99 (discussing less-directive structural 
reform injunctions).  
 49.  Obviously, some institutional reform lawsuits involve more claims and challenge more 
government actions than other lawsuits. 
 50.  The range of relief that a court can order after finding liability is narrower than the 
relief that the parties can agree to in a court-approved consent decree. As the Supreme Court has 
explained:  
Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to 
undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has 
been adjudicated. But we have no doubt that . . . [defendants] could settle the dispute 
over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that had been found by 
undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires (almost any affirmative 
decree beyond a directive to obey the Constitution necessarily does that), but also 
more than what a court would have ordered absent the settlement.  
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503 
U.S. 347, 354 n.6 (1992) (“[P]arties may agree to provisions in a consent decree which exceed the 
requirements of federal law.”); Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 
U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (“[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree 
merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a 
trial.”); Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2011 (“Such consent decrees have frequently incorporated 
terms that a judge could not lawfully include in a contested order.”). 
 Indeed, a consent decree must only “spring from, and serve to resolve, a dispute within the 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction[,] . . . come within the general scope of the case made by the 
pleadings[,] and . . . further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Frew 
v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). 
 51.  See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 813 (“In a significant number of cases, the 
affirmative program is of such extensive scope that its realization involves a basic restructuring 
of the procedures or organization of the defendant institution.”). 
 52.  See id. at 818 (“Given the detail of these decrees and the lack of judicial expertise, 
substantive modification and adjustment are unavoidable and should willingly be undertaken.”); 
Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 49 (discussing the “tentative and hesitant character” of 
institutional reform injunctions and contending that they “must always be open to revision”). But 
see Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1020 (characterizing institutional reform remedies of the 
1970s and 1980s as “one-time readjustment[s] to fixed criteria”). 
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necessary changes at the outset.53 As Professor Owen Fiss has 
observed, “There is no easy, one-shot method of reconstructing an 
institution.”54 After an injunction is ordered by a court, revisions will 
often be necessary because, for example, the injunction is not working 
effectively or its obligations become unduly burdensome for the 
defendant.55 Such revisions can be the product of negotiations between 
the parties or a litigated dispute before a judge. Regardless of how it 
happens, the success of an institutional reform injunction can depend 
on whether it is adapted to changing conditions. 
The second necessary condition is durability. An institutional 
reform injunction must remain in force long enough to achieve its 
goals, typically to eradicate the unlawful behavior that was the basis 
for the underlying lawsuit.56 It is not enough for the injunction to 
compel a series of remedial steps and then immediately dissolve into 
the ether. Rather, the injunction must remain in effect—and the court 
must retain jurisdiction to enforce the injunction—as long as is 
required to bring the government institution into compliance with its 
legal obligations.57 Although institutional reform injunctions must 
eventually come to an end,58 the difficulty of reforming government 
 
 53.  See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 789 (“The necessarily speculative nature of the 
institutional planning required to devise these remedial regimes means that no single order of 
relief can be regarded as definite and final . . . .”). 
 54.  FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 3, at 28. According to Fiss, “[A] series 
of interventions are inevitable, for the defendants’ performance must be evaluated, and new 
directions issued, time and time again.” Id.; see also Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 817 (“The 
complexity of the structural injunctions that are the usual outcome of successful institutional 
reform litigation does much to deprive them of their finality.”).  
 55.  See Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 817 (explaining that revisions to institutional 
reform injunctions “may be triggered by a variety of circumstances or events that emerge in the 
process of implementation”). 
 56.  See, e.g., id. at 842 (“The pervasive changes required of defendants are neither rapidly 
nor easily made.”); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 28 (“[T]he remedy involves the court in 
nothing less than the reorganization of an ongoing institution, so as to remove the threat it poses 
to constitutional values. The court’s jurisdiction will last as long as the threat persists.”).  
 57.  See, e.g., Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 842–44 (discussing how long courts retain 
jurisdiction over institutional reform injunctions); cf. id. at 842 (“Jurisdiction may even continue 
after the defendant’s full compliance with the terms of the decree: some courts have expressed 
concern that the reform be permanent.”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) 
(emphasizing that “[f]rom the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended 
as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination”). Writing in dissent, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall offered a somewhat different assessment of the appropriate duration of institutional 
reform injunctions involving school desegregation: 
The concepts of temporariness and permanence have no direct relevance to courts’ 
powers in this context because the continued need for a decree will turn on whether 
the underlying purpose of the decree has been achieved. “The injunction . . . is 
‘permanent’ only for the temporary period for which it may last. It is justified only by 
the violence that induced it and only so long as it counteracts a continuing 
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institutions means that the injunctions may need to remain in place 
for an extended period of time.59 
The flexibility and durability of institutional reform injunctions 
make it possible for institutional reform lawsuits to do more than 
merely identify legal violations and assign blame. Indeed, the 
injunctions have the potential to fundamentally reshape public 
institutions so that they comply with the law. But not all institutional 
reform injunctions achieve their goals,60 and even the successful ones 
have been assailed by critics of this form of litigation. The balance of 
this Part explores the debate over institutional reform litigation and 
the current state of institutional reform remedies. 
B. Institutional Reform Injunctions Under Attack 
Institutional reform litigation—and specifically the injunctions 
obtained through these lawsuits—has been controversial from the 
outset.61 With its focus on systemic policies and practices of large 
public institutions rather than isolated disputes between parties, early 
critics characterized institutional reform litigation as a radical 
departure from the traditional model of litigation.62 At the most basic 
level, the controversy is rooted in concerns about courts and judges 
restructuring government institutions that are failing to comply with 
 
intimidation. Familiar equity procedure assures opportunity for modifying and 
vacating an injunction when its continuance is no longer warranted.”  
Id. at 267 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941)). 
 59.  See, e.g., Buckholz et al., supra note 26, at 813 (noting that successful implementation 
of institutional reform injunctions “[g]enerally . . . requires ongoing remedial action extending 
over a substantial period of time”); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 27 (stating that the 
remedial phase in institutional reform litigation “involves a long, continuous relationship 
between the judge and the institution”).   
 60.  See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (discussing attempts by the courts to bring about institutional reform). 
 61.  See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 647, 656 (1988) (observing that, by 1976, “concern about the legitimacy of judicial efforts 
to implement social policy through structural decrees was widespread”).  
 62.  See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 3 (comparing institutional reform litigation with “the 
traditional conception of adjudication”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (arguing that litigation was not well-suited to the types of problems at 
issue in institutional reform litigation); see also Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 17 (“The 
structural mode is most often attacked on the ground that it involves a departure from some 
ideal form.”). 
 Not all scholars agree that institutional reform litigation represents such a departure from 
traditional forms of litigation. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 40 (arguing that institutional 
reform litigation broke no new ground with respect to either procedure or remedy); cf. Fiss, 
Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 36 (arguing that “what has evolved has been the form of 
adjudication, but not the function”). 
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the law. Thus, while proponents of institutional reform litigation have 
characterized it as an essential tool for ensuring that government 
institutions honor their legal obligations,63 opponents have questioned 
the legitimacy and capacity of courts ordering and overseeing such 
remedies, while also highlighting federalism and separation-of-powers 
concerns. 
Challenges to the legitimacy of institutional reform remedies 
tend to focus on the role of the judge in institutional reform 
litigation.64 Some scholars claim that judges who design, oversee, and 
enforce institutional reform remedies are stepping outside their 
proper role, exercising powers that are reserved to the executive and 
legislative branches of government.65 Such actions, they argue, raise 
concerns about the separation of powers66 and undermine political 
accountability.67 Relatedly, injunctions that involve federal judges 
overseeing state and local institutions have sparked strong objections 
on federalism grounds.68 
Critics of institutional reform litigation have also questioned 
whether judges have the capacity to design and oversee the types of 
injunctions that result from these lawsuits.69 Under this view, 
 
 63.  For early defenses of institutional reform litigation, see, for example, FISS, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION, supra note 3; Chayes, supra note 3; and Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3.  
More recent proponents of institutional reform litigation include Margo Schlanger, Charles 
Sabel, and William Simon. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2; Schlanger, supra note 27. 
 64.  See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 4, at 637 (contending “that since trial court remedial 
discretion in institutional suits is inevitably political in nature, it must be regarded as 
presumptively illegitimate”); see also Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform 
Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 161 (2003) (discussing “the core, 
and very deep, critique that judges exercising broad, long-term remedial authority over local 
institutions are playing God: making rules and issuing orders based solely or largely on their 
own personal moral views”). 
 65.  See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
949 (1978) (questioning the desirability of federal-court oversight of state governmental 
institutions); Nagel, supra note 4 (arguing that separation-of-powers principles limit the 
authority of federal courts to order relief against state institutions). 
 66.  See Nagel, supra note 4, at 664 (arguing that “separation of powers clearly does impose 
limitations on the authority of federal courts to undertake executive and legislative functions 
when ordering relief against state officials”); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1123–24 (arguing that 
“separation of powers principles require that the answer come from the political branches” rather 
than the courts). 
 67.  See Mishkin, supra note 65, at 958 (arguing that institutional reform remedies “can be 
used essentially to bypass majoritarian political controls”). 
 68.  See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 4, at 1140–41 (arguing that federal court involvement with 
day-to-day operations of state institutions violates federalism principles). 
 69.  See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 60, at 11–12 (discussing how judges are constrained in 
their decisions by both the prevailing legal culture and precedent); Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, 
at 1017–18 (summarizing concerns about the capacity of courts and judges to reform 
institutions). 
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institutional reform remedies are undermined by the judge’s and the 
plaintiffs’ lack of access to information about how the targeted 
institution operates,70 the inability to reach other government actors 
who are implicated in the institution’s ability to comply with the law,71 
and the limited influence on low-level bureaucrats who must 
ultimately carry out the sought-after reforms.72 
Other critics have focused more on the remedies themselves 
and less on the role and limitations of the judge. For example, some 
have worried that institutional reform injunctions—especially those 
that contain highly detailed action items—can entrench or “lock in” 
particular policies and procedures, thereby preventing future 
government officials from adopting their own approaches.73 A related 
concern is the potential for collusion between government defendants 
and plaintiffs during the injunction design phase. This can arise when 
the parties jointly craft a consent decree in which the defendant 
agrees to reforms that would be difficult or impossible to secure 
through the usual political processes.74 
The critiques of institutional reform litigation have not gone 
unaddressed. Scholars have vigorously defended the legitimacy of 
institutional reform litigation,75 while also proposing adjustments that 
 
 70.  See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1017 (“[C]ritics doubted that courts had the 
necessary information to supervise institutional restructuring effectively.”). 
 71.  See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural 
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979) (acknowledging the “structural 
limitations on the extent to which judges can utilize the role of political powerbroker”); Horowitz, 
supra note 4, at 1293 (“Even in a complex lawsuit with many parties, it is quite likely that some 
major actors in the field have been left out of the litigation.”).  
 72.  See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 44, at 807 (explaining that “[c]ourts lack the administrative 
capacity to alter basic institutional practices directly and are constrained by both a limited 
constitutional mandate and a narrow vision of their role”). 
 73.  See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 34 (“It is impossible for an agency to promulgate 
a regulation containing a clause such as ‘My successor cannot amend this regulation.’ But if the 
clause appears in a consent decree, perhaps the administrator gets his wish to dictate the 
policies of his successor.”); McConnell, supra note 4; see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, 
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4; Morley, supra note 4; Sandler & Schoenbrod, Supreme 
Court, supra note 4; Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding 
Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 892, 896–97 (2011) (discussing institutional reform 
consent decrees as a “source of [government] entrenchment through private law involv[ing] local 
governments entering into contractual precommitments that bind future governments”).  
 74.  See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 4, at 1294, 1305 (arguing that a consent decree can be “a 
shortcut around political constraints”); McConnell, supra note 4, at 301 (arguing that “one of the 
evils to be guarded against is the collusive settlement—government lawyers settling a suit on 
favorable terms to the opposing party precisely because they expect that successive 
administrations may be less sympathetic to its cause”); Serkin, supra note 73, at 897 (“The 
litigation process allows government actors to agree to politically unpalatable policy changes.”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1107 (1977) (dismissing 
federalism concerns by arguing that “the states are bound by federal law, including the Bill of 
Rights, and the ultimate power to determine the consistency of state laws with superior federal 
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would mitigate some of the concerns raised by critics.76 Yet while 
challenges to institutional reform litigation continue,77 its defenders 
have largely departed from the field.78 
As the debate over institutional reform litigation has unfolded 
in the pages of law reviews, the Supreme Court has expressed growing 
discomfort with this form of litigation.79 Since granting lower courts 
considerable leeway to formulate appropriate remedies in Brown II, 
the Court has offered increasingly unfavorable assessments of 
institutional reform litigation and its resulting injunctions.80 This 
criticism reached its peak in the Court’s most recent consideration of 
the subject, its 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores.81 In Horne, a 5-4 
majority held that injunctions resulting from institutional reform 
litigation must be easier to terminate than all other types of 
 
norms is allocated to a federal court”); Sturm, supra note 37, at 1359 (offering “a model of public 
remedial decisionmaking that accounts for the particular demands of the remedial process while 
complying with the requirements of a legitimate judicial role”); Zaring, supra note 26, at 1033–34 
(“To be sure, consent decrees permit elected officials to bind their successors, but the same is true 
of any contract with lock-in effects. By providing stability and certainty, consent decrees need not 
necessarily always be pernicious.” (footnote omitted)). 
 76.  See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 44, at 808 (describing how courts “should structure the 
remedial process to avoid, or at least minimize, the negative consequences of the remedial 
dilemma”). 
 77.  See, e.g., Morley, supra note 4. 
 78.  See Schlanger, supra note 27, at 629 (arguing that “civil rights injunctions deserve the 
energetic defense of those in favor of the values they protect”). 
 79.  See, e.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing the “Burger Court 
counterassault” on institutional reform litigation); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the 
Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 
84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s hostility toward institutional 
reform litigation)); Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional 
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 886 n.70 (2010) (observing, after 
Horne v. Flores, that “the Court’s hostility to prospective, injunctive relief seems, if anything, to 
have deepened”). 
 80.  See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (discussing the permissible scope of 
institutional reform remedies); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1977) (explaining that 
courts “must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own 
affairs, consistent with the Constitution”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (expressing 
concern that federal courts are “becom[ing] increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison 
operations”); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (urging federal courts to ground their 
rulings in constitutional requirements “rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a 
detention facility” (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 539)); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984) 
(emphasizing “the very limited role that courts should play in the administration of detention 
facilities”); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992) (holding that district 
courts must take a “flexible approach” to motions to modify or terminate institutional reform 
injunctions); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004) (expressing concern about institutional 
reform injunctions that “improperly deprive future officials of their designated legislative and 
executive powers”); Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 434 (2009) (holding that courts must “ensur[e] 
that ‘responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and 
its officials’ ” (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 442)). 
 81.  557 U.S. 433 (2004). 
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injunctions ordered by the federal courts.82 Such differential treatment 
is necessary, the Court explained, for three reasons: the likelihood 
that changed circumstances will necessitate a reexamination of 
injunctions that last for many years, federalism concerns caused by 
federal court interference with state and local institutions, and what 
the Court characterized as the unusual “dynamics” of institutional 
reform litigation.83 Thus, while the Court has not put an end to 
institutional reform litigation,84 the Horne decision reveals a Court 
that is deeply skeptical of this type of lawsuit and its resulting 
remedies.85 
Legislators have also expressed hostility towards institutional 
reform litigation. Congress targeted institutional reform litigation in 
1996, when it limited lawsuits challenging the policies and practices of 
America’s prisons.86 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, it is now 
more difficult for courts to issue new prison reform injunctions,87 and 
it is easier for defendants to overturn prison reform injunctions after 
they are in place.88 In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives has 
 
 82.  Id. at 450. 
 83.  Id. at 447–48. 
 84.  See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 64, at 156 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not sustained any 
broadside constitutional challenges to structural reform injunctions; challenges mounted on 
federalism and separation of powers grounds have succeeded only in causing the Court to warn 
lower court judges to be mindful of state and congressional prerogatives.”); Siegel, supra note 79, 
at 1113 (observing that “the apocalyptic confrontation between Warren Court ‘activism’ and 
Rehnquist Court ‘restraint’ never came to fruition” and “institutional reform limped on”); Yoo, 
supra note 4, at 1133 (“[T]his concern about federalism appears to be nothing more than that—a 
concern. The Court does not appear to have ever invalidated a structural remedy on the ground 
that it improperly intruded upon the proper authority of state and local institutions.”). 
 85.  See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 79, at 886 n.70 (observing, after Horne, that “the Court’s 
hostility to prospective, injunctive relief seems, if anything, to have deepened”); Elizabeth G. 
Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 139 (2015) (characterizing Horne as “an 
extended critique of (almost a rant against) institutional reform litigation”); Alex Reinert, 
Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L. 
REV. 931, 940 (2010) (“In Horne v. Flores, the Court imposed new barriers to systemic reform 
cases.”). 
 86.  See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(a), 3626; and in scattered sections of 28 and 
42 U.S.C.). 
 87.  See 18 U.S.C § 3626(a)(1)(A) (“The court shall not grant or approve any prospective 
relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary 
to correct the violation of the Federal right.”).  
 88.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A). Under the PLRA,  
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is 
ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener . . . 
2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief [or] 1 year 
after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief 
under this paragraph. 
          
2017] AGING INJUNCTIONS 187 
introduced legislation that would impose similar limits on the 
duration of consent decrees in all civil cases, but that bill has not yet 
been enacted into law.89 State legislatures have also passed laws 
intended to limit state officials’ ability to enter into consent decrees in 
institutional reform cases.90 
Given these barriers to securing and defending systemic relief, 
it is not surprising that institutional reform litigation is commonly 
understood to be in retreat. Indeed, observers have been commenting 
on its decline for decades,91 with some perceiving the death of 
institutional reform litigation92 and others characterizing institutional 
reform injunctions as “vestiges of a bygone era.”93 Whether due to the 
doctrinal shifts documented above, or a changing sense of the role of 
litigation in securing meaningful institutional reform, this form of 
litigation has lost much of the prominence and momentum it had 
during its initial phases.94 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1). The court shall grant the motion to terminate the injunction unless the 
court makes written findings that the injunction “remains necessary to correct a current and 
ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation 
of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive 
means to correct the violation.” Id. § 3626(b)(3). 
 89.  Consent Decree Fairness Act, H.R. 3041, 112th Cong. (2011). This was not the first 
time that Congress has attempted to limit the duration of institutional reform injunctions. See 
Judicial Improvement Act, 144 CONG. REC. S6187–88 (daily ed. June 11, 1998) (proposing a 
reform bill that would “prevent consent decrees from remaining in effect once a proper remedy 
has been implemented”). 
 90.  See, e.g., Jane Perkins, Negotiating Consent Decrees that Work, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 500, 502 (2008) (stating that “[s]ome states have enacted laws that require state officials to 
obtain the governor’s or legislature’s permission before entering into a consent decree”). 
 91.  See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law 
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1982) (observing that, by the mid-1970s, 
“[t]he long summer of social reform that occupied the middle third of the century was drawing to 
a close”). But cf. Schlanger, supra note 27, at 568–69 (comparing the “conventional story” of 
decline with a “revisionist story . . . of continuity in volume and perhaps in other important 
aspects of court-ordered practice”). 
 92.  See Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004) (observing 
that “structural injunctions have receded from the remedial scene” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Gilles, supra note 64, at 145 (referring to the “apparent death of the structural reform 
injunction”). But cf. Gilles, supra note 64, at 146–47 (discussing the rise of “calls for injunctive 
relief to restructure public institutions [coming] from the unlikely quarters of conservative think 
tanks and institutes”); Schlanger, supra note 27, at 566 (challenging “the generally accepted 
view . . . that civil rights injunctive practice has become essentially moribund”). 
 93.  Gilles, supra note 64, at 144 (observing that “judicially mandated structural reform 
injunctions appear to be vestiges of a bygone era”).  
 94.  See id. at 146 (attributing the decline of structural reform litigation to “a sort of sub-
constitutional, extra-legal discomfort with the role of judges in institutional reform litigation”); 
Schlanger, supra note 27, at 565 (observing that the “most common explanation” for changes in 
institutional reform litigation practice is “the increasing conservatism of the federal bench”). But 
cf. Schlanger, supra note 27, at 553 (“[T]he increasing conservatism of the federal bench has not 
been as devastating to civil rights injunctive practice as a more jurocentric view might predict.”).  
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Yet institutional reform litigation endures.95 Even though the 
number of new lawsuits has fallen from its peak,96 institutional reform 
litigation remains a powerful force for change.97 Public institutions 
continue to violate rights in a systemic manner,98 plaintiffs continue to 
bring institutional reform lawsuits, and courts continue to order new 
injunctions aimed at reforming those government institutions.99 
Moreover, countless injunctions issued in the past continue to 
influence the day-to-day operation of government institutions across a 
wide range of legal areas.100 The remedies may look somewhat 
different than in the past101—for example, many injunctions have 
shifted from highly detailed command-and-control-style directives to 
what Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon call 
“experimentalist intervention”102—but institutional reform litigation 
has not vanished.103 Indeed, even in the context of prisoner litigation, 
 
 95.  See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4, at 10 
(arguing that “the incidence and effect of institutional reform litigation” have not waned); Sabel 
& Simon, supra note 2, at 1021 (referring to the “protean persistence of public law litigation”); 
Schlanger, supra note 27, at 629 (“Public law litigation is far from dead.”). 
 96.  See Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2032 n.165 (observing that “the number of class action 
filings and of civil rights class action filings, brought both by prisoners and nonprisoners, 
followed a downward trend from their peak in the mid 1970s until the early 1990s”).  
 97.  See id. (disputing claim that institutional reform litigation has decreased in 
significance). 
 98.  See Gilles, supra note 64, at 145 (“There continue to exist sufficiently egregious, 
systemic constitutional issues that inspire (or could inspire) the requisite breadth of support and 
depth of reformist zeal to motor the machinery of the structural reform injunction.”). 
 99.  See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4, at 11 (“New 
decrees get issued, piling up on the old, few of which are actually terminated.”); Margo 
Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should End the Practical Obscurity of 
Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 515 (2010) (“Every year, federal and 
state courts put in place orders that regulate the prospective operations of certainly hundreds 
and probably thousands of large government and private enterprises.”).  
 100.  See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2034–35, 2035 nn.178–83 (identifying “current 
litigation and ongoing court-ordered reform in the areas of child welfare, mental health and 
mental retardation facilities, juvenile correction facilities, public housing, and public school 
funding” (footnotes omitted)). 
 101.  See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 27, at 602 (identifying, in the prison reform context, “a 
marked shift in what might be called the depth of court-ordered regulation, as the paradigm 
intervention shifted from an omnibus model to something more finegrained”). 
 102.  Simon & Sabel, supra note 2, at 1019 (“The evolution of structural remedies in recent 
decades can be usefully stylized as a shift away from command-and-control injunctive regulation 
toward experimentalist intervention.”). As Sabel and Simon explain, command-and-control 
regulation “takes the form of comprehensive regimes of fixed and specific rules set by a central 
authority. . . . By contrast, experimentalist regulation combines more flexible and provisional 
norms with procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured accountability.” Id. 
 103.  See id. at 1018 (stating that “despite decades of criticism and restrictive doctrines, the 
lower courts continue to play a crucial role in a still-growing movement of institutional reform in 
the core areas of public law practice . . . : schools, prisons, mental health, police, and housing”); 
Zaring, supra note 26, at 1020 (observing that institutional reform litigation “remains a vibrant 
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where, for over twenty years, federal law has curtailed the scope and 
duration of injunctions, institutional reform litigation persists.104 
C. What’s Left: The Pool of Aging Institutional Reform Injunctions 
Whatever the future holds for institutional reform litigation, 
there is currently a pool of injunctions that remain in effect, binding 
the parties, directing government defendants to take specified 
remedial measures, and granting judges continuing jurisdiction over 
the underlying case. The injunctions may be increasingly outdated105 
and difficult to identify,106 but they continue to influence a wide range 
of government institutions.107 
Yet it is not clear what will happen to these injunctions as they 
age. Whether due to lack of foresight or well-considered choices, the 
 
and active part of the law, governing a variety of different types of local institutions”). The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata, upholding a controversial prison reform injunction 
that addressed medical and mental health care, is the most recent example of a structural 
reform injunction surviving review by the Court. See 563 U.S. 493 (2011).  
 104.  See Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 155 (2015) (arguing that the PLRA “has succeeded in radically 
shrinking—but not eliminating—the coverage” or injunctions in prison reform litigation); Simon 
& Sabel, supra note 2, at 1038 (observing that even after the PLRA, “the volume of prison 
litigation remains substantial, and although structural orders tend to be narrower than in the 
past, they are still common”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Shima Baradaran-Robison, Kaleidoscopic Consent Decrees: School 
Desegregation and Prison Reform Consent Decrees After the Prison Litigation Reform Act and 
Freeman-Dowell, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1333, 1350 (“With the growth of prison litigation, Congress 
witnessed an analogous growth in ‘out-dated consent decrees’ managed by federal courts.” 
(quoting Peter Hobart, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Striking the Balance 
Between Law and Order, 44 VILL. L. REV. 981, 1003 (1999))). 
 106.  See Schlanger, supra note 99, at 520 (describing the “practical obscurity” of 
institutional reform injunctions); Schlanger, supra note 27, at 570–71 (noting that institutional 
reform injunctions are often “completely unobservable by ordinary case research methods”). As 
Margo Schlanger explains: 
[I]t turns out that most injunctive orders are not public, or at least not effectively so. 
They are filed with courts and then hidden away in court archives. They are typically 
difficult to obtain, as a collection or a single source, even for the well-funded and well-
informed. They are not embedded in an easily usable information infrastructure. Even 
a person who knows the type of case or its caption, its filing date, and its court, may or 
may not be able to obtain a particular injunction for a reasonable fee. The most 
persevering experts struggle and probably fail to find all the injunctions obtained by 
or against most government agencies, or all the injunctions about a specified subject. 
Schlanger, supra note 99, at 516. Even where courts have adopted electronic filing systems, older 
cases are either excluded from those systems or have had just their docket sheet digitized. And 
even where injunctions are available electronically, “locating a digitized decree often requires the 
same type of case-specific information needed to locate a hard-copy file.” Id. at 521.  
 107.  See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 23, at 2034–35 (referring to “ongoing court-ordered 
reform in the areas of, for example, child welfare, mental health and mental retardation 
facilities, juvenile correction facilities, public housing, and public school funding”  (footnotes 
omitted)).  
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parties and judges who designed institutional reform injunctions 
rarely specified how the injunctions should end. Rather, the text of the 
injunctions typically focused on the steps that government defendants 
must take in order to achieve compliance with their legal obligations, 
how their progress would be measured, and how the injunction could 
be enforced. 
It is easy to ignore the pool of existing institutional reform 
injunctions. After all, the injunctions are the product of lawsuits that 
were brought years, if not decades, ago. But these aging injunctions 
are not dusty relics from a bygone era. Unlike antiquated statutes 
that fall into desuetude, the passage of time has not rendered the 
injunctions irrelevant to the people whose rights they are designed to 
vindicate.108 To the contrary, the injunctions are concerned with 
governmental activities that are as vital today as they were when the 
injunctions were issued.109 
Moreover, once an institutional reform injunction is gone, there 
is no guarantee that plaintiffs can again obtain similar relief if the 
original violations reoccur. Changes in the legal landscape since 
Brown II have made it harder for plaintiffs to win new institutional 
reform lawsuits.110 Although not necessarily arising in the context of 
institutional reform litigation, a number of recent Supreme Court 
decisions now make it difficult or impossible for institutional reform 
plaintiffs to establish standing to sue,111 adequately plead their claims 
in a complaint,112 invoke private rights of action to enforce 
 
 108.  See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 27, at 629 (“[C]ivil rights injunctions deserve the 
energetic defense of those in favor of the values they protect.”). 
 109.  See, e.g., id. (“[W]e can be sure that [public law litigation] continues to regulate much 
government conduct in many jurisdictions.”). 
 110.  See, e.g., SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015) (discussing the increasing limitations on plaintiffs’ ability to 
enforce their rights through litigation); Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of 
Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1536 (2016) (observing that 
“procedural and substantive constraints on legal access now litter the doctrinal landscape”). 
 111.  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976); see also 
Gilles, supra note 64, at 146 (explaining that “courts have erected barriers, principally in the 
form of standing requirements, to the institution of suits aimed at structural reform 
injunctions”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 301, 333 (2002) (arguing that Article III standing rules disadvantage low-income 
plaintiffs). 
 112.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the 
Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 193 (2014) (demonstrating that Twombly, Iqbal, and other 
recent Supreme Court decisions have had “palpably negative effects on plaintiffs”). 
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constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions,113 and proceed as 
a class action.114 
Even when institutional reform claims remain viable, plaintiffs 
may not be able to find lawyers to bring the lawsuits.115 Federal 
funding for legal services has not kept up with the rising demand for 
representation since the early 1980s,116 and the legal services offices 
that receive federal funding have been barred from bringing class 
actions since 1996.117 Moreover, lawyers who are permitted to 
represent plaintiffs in institutional reform lawsuits are now less likely 
to be eligible for attorneys’ fees due to changes in Supreme Court 
precedent.118 
Despite the stakes, scholars have had little to say about the 
death of institutional reform injunctions. Institutional reform 
litigation received considerable attention as it rose to prominence in 
the 1960s and 1970s,119 but that largely waned by the 1990s.120 The 
 
 113.  See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (rejecting a 
private right of action to enforce Supremacy Clause); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 
(2002) (rejecting a private right of action to enforce federal statutory provisions); Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (rejecting a private right of action to enforce federal regulatory 
provisions); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil 
Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 900 (2016) (discussing recent cases that have “narrowed the 
rights of private parties to challenge statutory violations in court”). 
 114.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (adopting a highly 
restrictive interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2)); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 
(2011) (enforcing arbitration provision containing a class-action waiver despite lower-court ruling 
that it was unconscionable); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate 
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 629 (2012) 
(observing that “most class cases will not survive the impending tsunami of class action waivers” 
following Concepcion); David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 781 
(2016) (“Present-day upheaval in class action procedure threatens to alter—perhaps to imperil—
structural reform litigation in the federal courts.”). 
 115.  See Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693, 
1696–1705 (2004) (discussing limitations on the ability of lawyers to pursue NAACP-style 
litigation campaigns).  
 116.  See, e.g., Alan W. Houseman & Linda E. Perle, Securing Equal Justice for All: A Brief 
History of Civil Legal Assistance in the United States, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POL’Y 19–22, 29–33 
(2007), http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN3K-
AC2G] (summarizing history of legal services funding in the United States). 
 117.  See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–53 (1996) (“None of the funds appropriated in this Act 
to the Legal Services Corporation may be used to provide financial assistance to any person or 
entity . . . that initiates or participates in a class action suit.”). 
 118.  See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 610 (2001) (rejecting the “catalyst theory” as a permissible basis for an award of 
attorneys’ fees); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys 
General, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2007) (discussing Supreme Court decisions limiting the 
ability of plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees). 
 119.  See supra Part I.A–B. 
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winding down of school desegregation injunctions,121 the PLRA’s limits 
on prison reform injunctions,122 and the Supreme Court’s sporadic 
interest in reviewing motions to terminate or modify institutional 
reform injunctions,123 prompted some analysis of the end stages of 
institutional reform remedies. However, larger questions concerning 
the fate of existing injunctions have gone unanswered.124 
Parts II and III of this Article examine the fate of current and 
future institutional reform injunctions. For those injunctions, the 
pressing questions are: What is happening to the pool of existing 
institutional reform injunctions, and what should happen to those 
injunctions? Part II explores the first of these questions, while Part III 
takes up the second. 
II. A SHRINKING POOL: THE DEATH OF  
AGING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INJUNCTIONS 
Despite the controversy and backlash generated by 
institutional reform litigation, many institutional reform injunctions 
remain in effect. This pool of existing injunctions is not frozen in place, 
however. As an injunction ages, the likelihood that it will be 
terminated increases. While the termination of institutional reform 
injunctions is not intrinsically good or bad—indeed, every injunction 
must come to an end eventually—how and when an injunction 
terminates can have varying implications for the parties and judges 
involved in the litigation. By identifying the three ways that 
institutional reform injunctions are currently coming to an end—by 
dissolution, by design, and by disuse—and by drawing out the 
consequences of each form of injunction death, this Part offers a new 
perspective on this essential, yet often overlooked, aspect of 
institutional reform litigation. 
 
 120.  See Schlanger, supra note 27, at 567 (discussing “the sharp drop-off in scholarly 
interest in civil rights injunctions between the 1980s and the 1990s, when the stream of books 
and major law review articles slowed to a trickle”). 
 121.  See, e.g., Levine, supra note 5; Poser, supra note 5. 
 122.  See, e.g., Baradaran-Robison, supra note 105; Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, The 
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997). 
 123.  See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of 
Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101 (1986); Kim, supra note 6; David S. 
Konczal, Ruing Rufo: Ramifications of a Lenient Standard for Modifying Consent Decrees and an 
Alternative, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130 (1996); Kelley, supra note 6; Note, The Modification of 
Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020 (1986). 
 124.  But see SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE, supra note 4 (expressing 
concern about the longevity of institutional reform injunctions).  
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A. Death by Dissolution 
The most visible way that institutional reform injunctions end 
is when the court that originally ordered the injunction dissolves or 
terminates it. This can happen when, at some point during the 
lifespan of the injunction, the defendant files a motion to terminate 
the injunction under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.125 The most common basis for termination under Rule 
60(b) is that “a significant change either in factual conditions or in 
law” renders continued enforcement of the injunction “detrimental to 
the public interest.”126 If a defendant carries this burden, the court 
must terminate or modify the injunction in light of such changed 
circumstances.127 Unlike the other forms of injunction death discussed 
in this Part, termination through a Rule 60(b) motion typically results 
in a judicial opinion that creates a record of the termination.128 
While Rule 60(b) relief has always been available in 
institutional reform litigation,129 the standard for terminating an 
institutional reform injunction has changed in recent years. During 
the early decades of institutional reform litigation, the injunction-
termination standard was difficult to satisfy. Defendants needed to 
show either a change in law that rendered the injunction inconsistent 
with the law, or a “grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen 
conditions.”130 This was the termination standard that applied to any 
injunction issued by a federal court, regardless of whether it arose 
from institutional reform litigation or another type of litigation. 
More recently, the Supreme Court has made it easier to 
terminate institutional reform injunctions. Beginning in the early 
1990s131 and culminating with its 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores,132 
 
 125.  Motions to terminate an institutional reform injunction are typically made pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(5), which states that “the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding” if “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an 
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer 
equitable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). 
 126.  Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 
502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)).  
 127.  Horne, 557 U.S. at 447. 
 128.  See, e.g., 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2863 
(3d ed. 2016) (collecting cases). 
 129.  Aside from the general restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that took place 
in 2007, the current version of Rule 60(b) has been in effect since 1946. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60 
notes.  
 130.  United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). 
 131.  Rufo, 502 U.S. 367 (adopting flexible approach to Rule 60(b) motions for all 
institutional reform injunctions); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 
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the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to take a more “flexible 
approach” to motions to terminate institutional reform injunctions.133 
According to the Court, this flexibility should be used “to ensure that 
responsibility for discharging the [defendant’s] obligations is returned 
promptly to the State and its officials.”134 Regardless of whether the 
injunction is the product of a litigated decree or a consent decree,135 
courts must terminate institutional reform injunctions in accordance 
with this easier-to-satisfy standard. 
The Supreme Court’s message in Horne was clear: aging 
institutional reform injunctions are not entitled to the same respect as 
other injunctions.136 Indeed, the decision has been viewed as an 
invitation to defendants to file Rule 60(b) motions seeking to overturn 
institutional reform injunctions.137 And that appears to be what has 
 
248 (1991) (adopting flexible approach to Rule 60(b) motion to dissolve a school desegregation 
injunction).  
 132.  557 U.S. 433. 
 133.  Id. at 450 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381). The Court first adopted the “flexible 
approach” seventeen years earlier in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 
(1992), but Horne applied it in a way that made it even easier to terminate institutional reform 
injunctions. See Porter, supra note 85, at 140 (“Despite characterizing its decision as adhering to 
a ‘flexible approach,’ the Court made clear that such ‘flexibility’ had but one purpose: to return 
oversight responsibility to state and federal officials as soon as possible.”); Kelley, supra note 6, 
at 292 (arguing that the Court’s approach in Horne “would functionally eliminate the power of 
prophylactic decrees”). 
 134.  Horne, 557 U.S. at 450. The Court offered three reasons for making it easier to 
terminate institutional reform injunctions: the likelihood that changed circumstances will 
necessitate a reexamination of injunctions that last for many years, federalism concerns caused 
by federal court interference with state and local institutions, and what the Court characterized 
as the unusual “dynamics” of institutional reform litigation. Id. at 447–48. 
 135.  See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378 (describing a “consent decree” as “an agreement that the 
parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is 
subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees”); see also Sys. Fed’n No. 
91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (“The source of the power to modify [an existing consent 
decree] is of course the fact that an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the 
issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of 
the party who obtained that equitable relief.”); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 
(1932) (“We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in 
adaptation to changed conditions, though it was entered by consent. . . . If the reservation had 
been omitted [from the terms of the decree], power there still would be by force of principles 
inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery.”). 
 136.  See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 79, at 886 n.70 (arguing that Horne demonstrates the 
Court’s deepening hostility to prospective, injunctive relief); Kim, supra note 6, at 1466 (“Horne 
and its progeny have made it significantly easier for government-defendants to terminate 
ongoing decrees in institutional reform cases.”); Kelley, supra note 6, at 307 (“All the new 
standards introduced in Horne make it much easier for state and local governments, even those 
with a history of neglect, to escape court orders.”). 
 137.  See, e.g., Horne, 557 U.S. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the 
majority opinion “will create the dangerous possibility that orders, judgments, and decrees long 
final or acquiesced in, will be unwarrantedly subject to perpetual challenge, offering defendants 
unjustifiable opportunities endlessly to relitigate underlying violations with the burden of proof 
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happened during the seven years since Horne was decided. Lower 
courts have granted some motions138 and denied others,139 but the 
pattern has been established: government defendants claim that 
changed circumstances warrant the dissolution (or at least 
weakening) of existing institutional reform injunctions, while 
plaintiffs are left clinging to injunctions that are becoming 
increasingly outdated. 
At first glance, death by dissolution may appear to be entirely 
favorable to defendants and unfavorable to plaintiffs. But the 
implications of injunction termination under the easier-to-satisfy 
Horne approach can cut in different directions. On the one hand, 
government defendants are able to obtain relief from institutional 
reform injunctions that are no longer necessary or no longer equitable 
due to changes in the facts or law. Yet on the other hand, by signaling 
that institutional reform injunctions are worthy of less respect than 
other injunctions, the Supreme Court’s current approach is likely to 
complicate the implementation of existing injunctions. For example, if 
defendants believe that they can terminate injunctions sooner than 
originally expected, they may be less committed to the difficult work of 
achieving true and lasting structural reform. Similarly, defendants 
may choose to engage in foot-dragging in anticipation of an early 
motion to terminate. But even assuming good faith, an easier-to-
satisfy termination standard may create an added layer of uncertainty 
for defendants, especially those operating under older injunctions. If 
termination appears to be easier to obtain than in the past, 
defendants may be left unsure about the ongoing validity of 
injunctions that have been in force for some time. After all, if the 
defendant can go back to court and ask for termination based on the 
 
imposed once again upon the plaintiffs”); Porter, supra note 85, at 140 (observing that Horne 
decision “practically invit[es] those operating under consent decrees to file 60(b)(5) motions and 
strongly signal[s] lower courts to get out of the business of institutional reform”); Jonathan 
Simon, Horne v. Flores: The Roberts Court Takes Aim at Institutional Reform Litigation, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 3, 2009 12:49 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/08/ 
horne-v-flores-the-roberts-court-takes-aim-at-institutional-reform-litigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/GG49-MLWM] (“What goes without saying is that there will be a great deal of 
new litigation testing the meaning of institutional reform injunction under these new defendant 
(and intervenor) friendly standards.”). 
 138.  See, e.g., Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2015); John B. v. Emkes, 710 F.3d 394 
(6th Cir. 2013); Petties v. District of Columbia, 662 F.3d 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Consumer 
Advisory Bd. v. Harvey, 697 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132–33 (D. Me. 2010); Basel v. Bielaczyz, No. 74-
40135-BC, 2009 WL 2843906 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 1, 2009). 
 139.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cty., 712 F.3d 761 (2d Cir. 2013); L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Tennessee, 615 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2010); Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126 
(D.D.C. 2010); Juan F. v. Rell, No. 3:89-CV-859 (CFD), 2010 WL 5590094 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 
2010); LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98–100, 115 (D.D.C. 2010). 
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Horne analysis, government officials may feel less pressure to comply 
with the injunction. But until an injunction is terminated, it remains 
binding and a defendant’s failure to comply may expose it to court-
ordered sanctions. 
The Court’s apparent disdain for institutional reform litigation 
and the weaker injunction-termination standard announced in Horne 
are also likely to lead to earlier and more frequent termination 
motions.140 These motions impose costs on the parties and the court. 
As a general matter, litigating motions to terminate diverts attention 
and resources from the implementation, monitoring, and enforcement 
of the injunction. Motions to terminate can also waste judicial and 
litigant resources, particularly when they are merely a second bite at 
the apple, enabling defendants to relitigate issues that were decided 
before the injunction came into effect. These costs typically affect 
institutional reform plaintiffs more than defendants, as the plaintiffs’ 
access to legal resources is usually more limited. 
Beyond the impact on the pool of existing injunctions, the 
Supreme Court’s approach also has implications for the design and 
implementation of future injunctions. In the past, when institutional 
reform injunctions were subject to the traditional injunction-
termination standard, the designers of an injunction could justifiably 
assume that it would be in place for an indefinite period of time. This 
is no longer a safe assumption. Thus, designers today must anticipate 
the possibility of earlier termination by, for example, requiring the 
defendant to implement reforms and come into compliance on a 
compressed timetable. Similarly, the specter of early termination may 
also prompt quicker motions for contempt when a defendant is out of 
compliance with the injunction; if plaintiffs are not confident that an 
injunction will remain in place, they may feel compelled to 
aggressively enforce its terms rather than give the defendant more 
time to improve its performance. 
B. Death by Design 
Terminating an institutional reform injunction does not 
necessarily require a trip to court—some end according to the terms of 
the injunction itself. This occurs when the designers of the 
injunction—whether the judge in the case of a litigated decree, or the 
parties in the case of a consent decree—specify at the outset when and 
under what conditions the injunction will terminate. Although there is 
no standard language or set of triggering events for injunction-
 
 140.  See supra note 137. 
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termination provisions, they can be grouped into two categories: those 
based on the passage of time and those based on the defendant’s 
performance.141 
Time-based termination provisions mandate that the 
injunction will end after the passage of a specified period of time or on 
a particular date. The injunction’s termination is therefore not linked 
to whether the policies and practices targeted by the injunctive relief 
actually have been reformed. Indeed, the injunction will cease to bind 
the parties once the time limit is reached regardless of the defendant’s 
compliance with the injunction. 
In contrast, performance-based termination provisions become 
operative only when the defendant meets certain benchmarks or 
standards set forth in the injunction. Performance-based termination 
provisions are common where the legal violation targeted by the 
lawsuit is one that is easily measurable. So, for example, in 
institutional reform lawsuits challenging delays in agency processing 
or adjudication, the injunction may remain in force until the 
defendant shows that the unlawful delays have been eliminated. 
Similarly, if the litigation is targeting systemic agency errors, the 
injunction can be designed to last until the error rate is reduced to an 
acceptable level. Regardless of the specific goals, these performance-
based termination provisions are intended to ensure that the 
injunction remains in force as long as necessary to remedy the 
underlying violation. 
The implications of injunction death by design vary depending 
on whether the termination is based on time or performance. For 
injunctions that end due to the mere passage of time, the most 
striking consequence is that the injunction may terminate before the 
defendant has actually remedied the alleged unlawful conduct that 
gave rise to the litigation in the first place. To be sure, injunctions 
that include time-based termination provisions are intended to fix the 
problem before the injunction expires;142 however, it is not difficult to 
imagine violations persisting when the injunction’s time-based 
termination provision becomes operative. Plaintiffs are always free to 
file a new lawsuit and seek another injunction against the defendant, 
but such relitigation threatens to waste judicial and litigant resources. 
Moreover, given that plaintiffs in institutional reform lawsuits tend to 
 
 141.  Some termination provisions are hybrids, establishing that the injunctions will come to 
an end based on some combination of the passage of time and the achievement of specified 
performance benchmarks.  
 142.  After all, that is the point of the injunction. In addition, in institutional reform lawsuits 
that proceed as class actions, any settlement or consent decree cannot be approved by the district 
court until the court finds that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
          
198 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:167 
have limited access to legal resources, relitigating a violation because 
a previous injunction was time-limited raises distributive justice 
concerns. Finally, knowing that the injunction will terminate 
regardless of its performance can create undesirable incentives for the 
defendant; for example, in an effort to run out the clock, it may choose 
strategic foot-dragging over implementing the difficult reforms 
necessary to remedy the violations targeted by the litigation. 
In contrast, injunctions that are set to terminate upon the 
satisfaction of specified performance goals have a different set of 
implications for institutional reform litigation. Although somewhat 
counterintuitive, not all injunctions that end due to performance-
based terminations are success stories. Performance-based 
termination provisions are typically part of an injunction’s original 
design, meaning that years—if not decades—can go by before the 
provisions become operative. Given the limits of foresight, just because 
a defendant’s performance reaches a previously specified benchmark 
does not guarantee that the underlying violations have been 
remedied.143 That depends on the extent to which the benchmark 
continues to reflect compliance with the law. Relatedly, the success of 
performance-based termination provisions also depends on the 
injunction’s monitoring and reporting provisions; without access to 
performance data that is comprehensive and accurate, it is difficult for 
the parties and the court to know whether a defendant has satisfied 
the performance goals that trigger termination of the injunction.144 
Performance-based termination of institutional reform 
injunctions raises another concern: the threat of relapse. Injunctions 
that end because the defendant meets or exceeds the prescribed 
performance benchmarks may no longer be necessary, as where the 
defendant has institutionalized reforms that will prevent future 
violations from occurring. However, meeting performance benchmarks 
at one point in time does not necessarily mean that a defendant has 
undergone such reforms. Thus, performance-based termination may 
leave the door open for old violations to recur soon after the plaintiff 
and the court direct their gaze elsewhere. 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Jost, supra note 123, at 1102 (describing the “baffling perplexities” that courts 
encounter when they attempt to envision the future in institutional reform litigation).  
 144.  The difficulty of designing effective performance metrics for governmental entities is 
well documented in the bureaucracy literature. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL 
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE 40–53 (rev. ed. 2010); JAMES Q. 
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 154–78 (1991). 
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C. Death by Disuse 
Institutional reform injunctions are also ending as a result of 
disuse. This is a form of constructive termination that occurs when an 
injunction is forgotten or ignored by the parties responsible for 
implementing and monitoring it, and by the court charged with 
overseeing it. For injunctions that do not automatically expire upon 
the passage of a specified period of time,145 death by disuse can 
happen when an otherwise indefinite injunction ages and the parties, 
lawyers, and judges who were involved in the litigation shift their 
attention to other matters, retire, or even die themselves. The 
injunction remains binding on paper, but at some point it falls into 
desuetude and becomes, in effect, dormant.146 
For obvious reasons, the likelihood of this form of termination 
increases as an injunction ages. Although the participants in 
institutional reform litigation can take actions to ensure that old 
injunctions do not fade away—for example, new lawyers can take over 
for outgoing lawyers, new party representatives can be substituted for 
those who are no longer involved in the case, and new judges can 
replace judges who leave the bench—these steps are not always taken. 
Thus, as institutional reform injunctions grow older, they become 
susceptible to falling into disuse. 
By its very nature, death by disuse is nearly impossible to 
observe or track. It results not from a court ruling or a termination 
provision written into the injunction, but from inactivity, inattention, 
and fading memories. That said, an example from New York City 
spanning over twenty years and two separate lawsuits illustrates one 
way that this form of injunction death can unfold. 
The story begins in 1980, when individuals with mobility 
impairments filed Heyer v. New York City Housing Authority, 
challenging the public housing authority’s failure to provide 
reasonable accommodations.147 The district court certified a class,148 
 
 145.  See supra Part II.B. 
 146.  See, e.g., Sarah N. Welling & Barbara W. Jones, Prison Reform Issues for the Eighties: 
Modification and Dissolution of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 20 CONN. L. REV. 865, 886 
(1988) (noting that some institutional reform injunctions “just lapse into a dormant state from 
lack of attention”). It is possible that such injunctions can be revived after years of dormancy. 
See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 
48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 215 (2013) (discussing the potential revival of “orphan” prisoner-
rights decrees following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011)). 
This Section, however, is focused on injunctions that effectively terminate due to disuse.  
 147.  Complaint, Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 
1980). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the New York City Housing Authority failed to 
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and, in 1982, so-ordered a settlement agreement that required the 
defendant to take certain remedial steps under the supervision of the 
district court.149 The Heyer settlement had no termination provision, 
but at some point it fell into disuse.150 This became apparent in 2002, 
when a new group of plaintiffs filed Bennett v. New York City Housing 
Authority, a class action challenging similar violations at the housing 
authority.151 None of the participants in the Bennett litigation initially 
were aware of the Heyer settlement—not the plaintiffs (who were 
members of the class certified in Heyer), not the government 
defendants, not the lawyers for either side, and not the judge assigned 
to the case. In fact, the parties fully litigated a motion to dismiss, 
which resulted in a reported decision.152 It was not until 2005—three 
years after Bennett was filed—that the parties and the court became 
aware of the Heyer settlement. At that point, the Bennett litigation 
was consolidated with the Heyer litigation, and the parties negotiated 
a new settlement agreement that was approved by the Heyer judge in 
2006.153 
The implications of injunction death by disuse are not easy to 
assess. It may be that disuse is a sign that an injunction is no longer 
necessary. An injunction may fall into disuse when both the plaintiffs 
and the defendants are content with the inactivity, either because the 
status quo is acceptable to both parties or because the potential 
benefit of disturbing the status quo—for example, by making a motion 
to enforce, modify, or terminate the injunction—creates risks or costs 
that neither party wants to incur. Either way, this type of disuse does 
not seem to be objectionable. 
However, injunctions that fall into disuse can have 
implications that are not so benign. Whether the product of a litigated 
injunction or a consent decree, institutional reform injunctions set 
 
provide individuals with mobility impairments who have been, are, or will be qualified for the 
Section 8 program with effective assistance in finding accessible housing. See id. 
 148.  Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1980) (order 
granting plaintiffs’ motion for class certification). 
 149.  Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1982) 
(approving Stipulation of Settlement and Order). 
 150.  See Special Litigation Unit: Bennett v. NYCHA (2002), N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRP. 
(2016), http://nylag.org/units/special-litigation-unit/monitoring-and-individual-relief-cases/ 
bennett-v-new-york-city-housing-authority [https://perma.cc/QY9N-KYCF] (stating that the 
Heyer settlement was “never enforced”). 
 151.  Complaint, Bennett v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 1:02–cv-03499 (CPS) (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 
17, 2002). The Bennett plaintiffs brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and 
the Fair Housing Act.  
 152.  Bennett v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 248 F. Supp. 2d 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 153.  Heyer v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 80 Civ. 1196 (RWS), 2006 WL 1148689 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 28, 2006). 
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forth what the government defendant is required to do. Yet as these 
injunctions age and their viability is eroded by the passage of time, 
the injunctions are becoming an unexpected source of uncertainty. 
When an aging injunction falls into disuse, it becomes less clear to the 
defendant whether it is still bound by the injunction. The defendant 
does not know whether its actions are still governed by the injunction 
or whether it will be subject to a contempt or enforcement motion for 
failing to comply. The injunction’s beneficiaries are similarly left in 
the dark: they do not know whether the injunction continues to be a 
source of rights or whether they can challenge the defendant’s 
violations of those rights by enforcing the terms of the injunction. 
Injunctions that effectively end due to disuse also raise 
concerns about the allocation of institutional reform litigation 
resources. When an injunction fades away, the violations that gave 
rise to the underlying lawsuit may resume in the future. In such 
instances, rather than using the old injunction to challenge the 
violations, new plaintiffs must bring a new lawsuit. Such litigation 
occurs on a clean slate, requiring the parties and the judge to expend 
resources that were already spent as part of the earlier lawsuit and 
would have been avoided had the earlier injunction remained active. 
Death by disuse can also raise distributive justice concerns. 
Preventing an institutional reform injunction from falling into disuse 
is largely the job of the plaintiffs. Unless the plaintiffs monitor the 
defendant’s compliance with the injunction and seek to enforce the 
injunction when noncompliance becomes apparent, an injunction is 
likely to become inactive. Such vigilance requires the expenditure of 
legal resources well after the injunction has been secured. As 
discussed above, plaintiffs in institutional reform litigation typically 
have limited access to legal resources, meaning that they have less 
capacity to vigilantly police their injunctions than plaintiffs who win 
injunctions in other types of lawsuits. Thus, injunction death by 
disuse is likely to disproportionately prejudice low-income plaintiffs 
who rely on overburdened and under-resourced public interest 
lawyers. 
Finally, there is also a less obvious consequence to injunction 
death by disuse: the impact on the rule of law. Until a judge 
affirmatively terminates an institutional reform injunction, the 
injunction is a court order that creates legally binding obligations. But 
when institutional reform injunctions lapse into dormancy, the legal 
force of these injunctions is cast into doubt even though the 
injunction—at least on paper—is as binding as it was on the day it 
was issued. In this way, an otherwise valid court order can lose its 
power without any action from the court. And, consequently, 
          
202 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:167 
defendants can defy the injunction without fear of sanction. Thus, 
death by disuse renders institutional reform injunctions more 
vulnerable to disrespect and disregard than other court orders that 
similarly remain on the books for years after they are issued by a 
court. 
III. THE FUTURE OF AGING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INJUNCTIONS 
As time marches on, a growing number of aging institutional 
reform injunctions will predictably come to an end. As has been the 
case thus far, the parties and judges involved with institutional 
reform lawsuits will struggle with determining how and when the 
injunctions should be terminated. Part II of this Article surveyed the 
current state of institutional reform injunction death, cataloguing 
three different ways in which these injunctions are ending. It also 
suggested that even though each form of termination has a similar 
result—the injunction is no longer in force—they have different 
implications for institutional reform litigation. 
This Part shifts the focus to the future: it considers the fate of 
institutional reform injunctions that are currently in force as well as 
those injunctions that have yet to come into existence. Section A 
argues that now is the time to move away from the often haphazard 
termination of injunctions, and to think more explicitly about when 
and how institutional reform injunctions should end. Then, Section B 
and Section C explore two moments in the course of institutional 
reform litigation in which the issue of injunction death is vital. The 
first is when an injunction is in force but in danger of termination, and 
the second is when the parties or the judge are designing a new 
injunction. In sum, by drawing on relevant doctrine and recent 
experience with aging injunctions, Part III offers a roadmap for the 
end stages of institutional reform litigation that is consistent with the 
goals and limitations of this important and enduring form of litigation. 
A. Reconsidering the Death of Institutional Reform Injunctions 
By any measure, institutional reform litigation has received its 
fair share of scrutiny during the sixty years since Brown II.154 Yet 
scholars have paid comparatively little attention to the end stages of 
institutional reform injunctions, focusing instead on foundational 
questions concerning the legitimacy and effectiveness of this form of 
 
 154.  See supra Part I. 
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litigation.155 Nonetheless, injunction death is an essential part of the 
institutional reform story, and the number of cases to reach that final 
stage only grows with time. 
All participants in institutional reform litigation—the parties, 
the lawyers, and the judges—must at some point grapple with the end 
of the litigation. It is easy to overlook or postpone end-stage planning 
in favor of focusing on the design and implementation of an 
injunction’s substantive provisions. But, ultimately, when and under 
what conditions the injunction terminates may be as vital to the goals 
of the litigation as other, more substantive aspects of the remedy. 
Indeed, the parties in institutional reform litigation ignore 
injunction death at their own peril. As the discussion in Part II 
illustrates, how an injunction ends can have significant implications 
for the participants in the underlying litigation. Yet despite the 
seemingly haphazard ways that institutional reform injunctions often 
come to an end, when and how an injunction dissolves need not be left 
to the whims of fate. By preparing for that eventual outcome at earlier 
stages of the litigation, parties and judges can increase the likelihood 
that an injunction is terminated at the appropriate time and in an 
appropriate manner.156 
Looking ahead, the lessons of past injunction terminations offer 
useful guidance for both the termination of existing injunctions and 
the design of future injunctions. For injunctions that are already in 
place, the challenge is to prevent them from being terminated before 
their goals have been achieved. This can involve identifying aging 
injunctions to ensure that they do not fall into disuse, carefully 
applying Supreme Court case law on the standard for motions to 
terminate institutional reform injunctions, and reviving a truly 
flexible understanding of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. For future injunctions, this effort can include design 
innovations that establish, at the outset, when and how the injunction 
should terminate and the monitoring and reporting that will be used 
to trigger termination. Taken together, these efforts can help ensure 
that institutional reform injunctions are not terminated before their 
objectives have been achieved. 
 
 155.  See supra Part I.C. 
 156.  See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 41, at 350 (observing that participants in institutional 
reform litigation “have become acutely aware of the need to clarify the conditions for terminating 
jurisdiction at the time the order is crafted”).  
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B. Avoiding Premature Death of Existing Injunctions 
Institutional reform injunctions that are currently in force can 
seem to be under constant threat of termination. Rule 60(b) enables 
government defendants to file termination motions at any time, and 
the Supreme Court’s recent approach to these motions has increased 
the likelihood that lower courts will grant them.157 But Rule 60(b) 
allows for more than just dissolution of court orders, and the Supreme 
Court has declined to bar institutional reform injunctions despite 
ample opportunities to do so.158 Thus, even though institutional reform 
injunctions appear to be under siege, premature death can be 
prevented by, for example, carefully applying the Supreme Court’s 
Rule 60(b) precedents, pursuing truly flexible Rule 60(b) relief, and 
ensuring that aging injunctions are not forgotten. 
1. Careful Application of the Supreme Court’s Rule 60(b) Precedents 
For institutional reform injunctions that face termination 
pursuant to Rule 60(b), careful application of Supreme Court 
precedent is essential to ensure that the injunctions are not dissolved 
prematurely. Although the Supreme Court decided Horne v. Flores 
more than seven years ago, it remains the Court’s most recent 
pronouncement on the termination of institutional reform 
injunctions.159 Because Horne is the leading case on the Rule 60(b) 
standard, it is important to identify with specificity what the Court 
said (and did not say) about the termination of institutional reform 
injunctions. 
Horne identifies three aspects of institutional reform litigation 
that, in the Court’s view, justify relaxing the termination standard for 
injunctions arising from this particular type of lawsuit. According to 
the Court, institutional reform injunctions must be easier to overturn 
because they often remain in force for many years, they raise sensitive 
federalism concerns, and the dynamics of institutional reform 
litigation differ from those of other cases.160 Each of these features 
 
 157.  See supra Part II.A. 
 158.  See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 79, at 1113 (explaining that “the apocalyptic confrontation 
between Warren Court ‘activism’ and Rehnquist Court ‘restraint’ never came to fruition” and 
“institutional reform litigation limped on”); Gilles, supra note 64, at 156 (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has not sustained any broadside constitutional challenges to structural reform injunctions; 
challenges mounted on federalism and separation of powers grounds have succeeded only in 
causing the Court to warn lower court judges to be mindful of state and congressional 
prerogatives.”). 
 159.  557 U.S. 433 (2009). 
 160.  See id. at 448. 
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highlights important issues related to institutional reform litigation, 
but, upon closer examination, they do not apply equally to every 
institutional reform injunction. 
The Horne Court is surely correct that institutional reform 
injunctions “often remain in force for many years, and the passage of 
time frequently brings about changed circumstances—changes in the 
nature of the underlying problem, changes in governing law or its 
interpretation by the courts, and new policy insights—that warrant 
reexamination of the original judgment.”161 Yet not every institutional 
reform injunction challenged under Rule 60(b) fits this description.162 
It is the court’s task to determine whether changed circumstances are 
present in a particular case.163 If such changes have occurred, the 
court must then decide whether modification or termination of the 
injunction is appropriate.164 Indeed, that is what Rule 60(b) 
requires.165 Whether institutional reform injunctions, as a general 
matter, “often remain in force for many years, and the passage of time 
frequently brings about changed circumstances,”166 is not relevant to 
whether, in a particular case, the circumstances have changed in a 
way that requires modification or termination of the injunction. 
Similarly, it may be true that, as Horne states, “institutional 
reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns” and that 
these concerns are “heightened” when an injunction “has the effect of 
dictating state or local budget priorities,” for example, when “a federal 
court orders that money be appropriated for one program.”167 Some 
institutional reform injunctions, like the one at issue in Horne, require 
state and local governments to devote substantial resources, financial 
and otherwise, to remedy ongoing violations of the law. But not all do, 
either because they involve only federal government defendants,168 or 
because they do not impinge on state and local governments to a 
similar extent. Lower courts reviewing Rule 60(b) motions can surely 
distinguish between these types of injunctions. Thus, Horne’s 
generalized federalism concerns should not weigh in favor of 
 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cty., 712 F.3d 761 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion seeking to 
dissolve injunction entered less than four years earlier).  
 163.  See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992).  
 164.  See id. 
 165.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (stating that a party may be relieved from a judgment when 
“applying it prospectively is no longer equitable”). 
 166.  Horne, 557 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added). 
 167.  Id. at 448. 
 168.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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termination without a court finding that those concerns are present 
with respect to the injunction under review. 
The Horne Court’s third concern calls for closer scrutiny as 
well. According to the Court, a lower threshold for Rule 60(b) motions 
is necessary because “the dynamics of institutional reform litigation 
differ from those of other cases.”169 As examples, the Court noted that 
“public officials sometimes consent to, or refrain from vigorously 
opposing, decrees that go well beyond what is required by federal law,” 
and these decrees “bind state and local officials to the policy 
preferences of their predecessors and may thereby ‘improperly deprive 
future officials of their designated legislative and executive 
powers.’ ”170 Furthermore, the Court explained that “[w]here ‘state and 
local officials . . . inherit overbroad or outdated consent decrees that 
limit their ability to respond to the priorities and concerns of their 
constituents,’ they are constrained in their ability to fulfill their duties 
as democratically-elected officials.”171 Again, while it may be true that 
these “dynamics” are present in some cases, even the Horne majority 
acknowledged that not all (or even most) institutional reform 
injunctions raise these concerns.172 Moreover, it is far from clear that 
the Court’s concerns about policy entrenchment and collusion are as 
unusual or troubling as the Court suggests.173 In any event, rather 
than accept these broad characterizations as grounds for dissolving 
institutional reform injunctions under Rule 60(b), lower courts must 
determine whether the injunction at issue in fact raises the types of 
concerns identified by the Horne Court. 
Thus, not all of the concerns identified in Horne are present in 
all institutional reform cases. It is therefore the task of the lower 
 
 169.  Horne, 557 U.S. at 448. 
 170.  Id. at 449 (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004)). 
 171.  Id. (quoting American Legislative Exchange Council, Resolution on the Federal 
Consent Decree Fairness Act (2006), App. to Brief for American Legislative Exchange Council et 
al. as Amici Curiae 1a–4a). 
 172.  See id. at 448 (“[P]ublic officials sometimes consent to, or refrain from vigorously 
opposing, decrees that go well beyond what is required by federal law.” (emphasis added)); id. at 
449 (institutional reform injunctions that “bind state and local officials to the policy preferences 
of their predecessors . . . may thereby ‘improperly deprive future officials of their designated 
legislative and executive powers’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Frew, 540 U.S. at 441)). 
 173.  As Justice Breyer observed in dissent, the Horne majority’s discussion of institutional 
reform litigation “reflects one side of a scholarly debate about how courts should properly handle 
decrees in ‘institutional reform litigation.’ ” Id. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting). More specifically, 
with respect to the majority’s concerns about institutional reform injunctions limiting 
government officials’ ability to change or adopt new policies, such policy entrenchment is neither 
uncommon for government officials nor necessarily a reason to overturn such injunctions. See, 
e.g., Zaring, supra note 26, at 1033–34 (“To be sure, consent decrees permit elected officials to 
bind their successors, but the same is true of any contract with lock-in effects. By providing 
stability and certainty, consent decrees need not necessarily always be pernicious.”). 
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courts adjudicating Rule 60(b) motions to find whether and to what 
extent the concerns are present in the particular case under review. If, 
as the majority found in Horne, all three are present, then a more 
flexible approach to termination may be warranted.174 However, if a 
motion to terminate is based on nothing more than a defendant’s 
invocation of one or more of the concerns identified in Horne, the court 
should apply the normal Rule 60(b) standard.175 
In addition to scrutinizing what Horne did say, it is important 
to note what the Court did not say. The Court did not disturb its prior 
holdings concerning the scope of consent decrees in institutional 
reform litigation. Horne involved an injunction issued by the district 
court based on its findings that the defendants had violated the law. 
In reviewing the injunction, the Court relied on prior decisions holding 
that litigated injunctions cannot order the defendant to do more than 
federal law requires.176 Horne left undisturbed the Court’s long-
standing view that a consent decree—unlike a litigated decree—can 
compel an institutional reform defendant to do more than is required 
by law.177 Thus, Horne’s demand for a seamless fit between the 
 
 174.  See Horne, 557 U.S. at 447–51. 
 175.  The Second Circuit rejected such an argument in United States ex rel. Anti-
Discrimination Center of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester County, 712 F.3d 761 (2d Cir. 
2013). There, the county defendant argued that the injunction should be terminated under Rule 
60(b) and Horne because members of the county government are subject to term limits and 
therefore “cannot bind their successors to the obligations of the consent decree.” Id. at 771. The 
Second Circuit disagreed, noting that, “if accepted, it would terminate all of the obligations 
under the consent decree at the close of the terms of office during which the agreement was 
entered. Such a conclusion would amount to a sea change in the operation of consent decrees in 
the United States.” Id. The court thus rejected the defendant’s argument, holding that “a local 
government is not relieved of its obligations under a consent decree taken on behalf of a previous 
administration merely because new local officials will and do take office.” Id.; cf. Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1327 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding, prior to Horne, that “the election of a 
new administration does not relieve [a local government] of valid obligations assumed by 
previous administrations”).  
 176.  See Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (explaining that “courts must remain attentive to the fact 
that ‘federal court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition 
that does not violate [federal law] or does not flow from such a violation’ ” (quoting Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977))); see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 
389 (1992) (“Federal courts may not order States or local governments, over their objection, to 
undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing a constitutional violation that has been 
adjudicated.”).  
 177.  See, e.g., Rufo, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1994) (“[W]e have no doubt that . . . [the government 
defendants] could settle the dispute over the proper remedy for the constitutional violations that 
had been found by undertaking to do more than the Constitution itself requires . . . , but also 
more than what a court would have ordered absent the settlement.”); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 
347, 354 n.6 (1992) (“[P]arties may agree to provisions in a consent decree which exceed the 
requirements of federal law.”); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 
(1986) (“[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because 
the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.”). 
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defendant’s federal-law violation and the terms of the injunction does 
not extend to institutional reform injunctions that arise from consent 
decrees. 
Nor did Horne overrule the Court’s prior rulings concerning 
when it is appropriate to dissolve injunctions under Rule 60(b).178 
Prior to Horne, the Court made clear that continued enforcement of an 
institutional reform injunction is appropriate until the defendant has 
implemented a remedy that is durable. In other words, a defendant 
cannot escape an injunction the moment it fixes whatever problems 
gave rise to the underlying litigation. For example, the Court ruled 
that dissolution of a school desegregation injunction was appropriate 
when the district court found that the school board has complied with 
the law for “a reasonable period of time” and that it was “unlikely that 
the school board would return to its former ways.”179 Although the 
Horne Court did not speak clearly on the appropriate duration of 
institutional reform injunctions,180 its reference to a remedy that is 
“durable” suggests that lower courts should not terminate 
institutional reform injunctions the moment the defendant has 
managed to cease its unlawful behavior.181 Rather, as is the case with 
all prospective injunctive relief, the injunctions should remain in force 
as long as they are still deterring noncompliance with the law.182 
 
 178.  See Kelley, supra note 6, at 293 (observing that the Horne Court “did not explicitly 
disavow prior decisions that employed stricter standards for modifying decrees”). 
 179.  Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–48 (1991).  
 180.  Compare Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (“If a durable remedy has been implemented, 
continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.” (emphasis added)), 
with id. at 450 (“A flexible approach [to the Rule 60(b) analysis] allows courts to ensure that 
‘responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its 
officials’ when the circumstances warrant.” (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004) 
(emphasis added))), and id. at 451 (criticizing the lower court for failing to “applying a flexible 
standard that seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon as a violation of federal 
law has been remedied” (emphasis added)). Not surprisingly, in the wake of Horne, “lower courts 
have struggled to ascertain the standards applicable in various cases.” Kelley, supra note 6, at 
293. 
 181.  See Horne, 557 U.S. at 450 (“If a durable remedy has been implemented, continued 
enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.”); see also Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. 
Supp. 2d 126, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) (“What it means to have a ‘durable remedy’ is a question that 
Horne does not answer, but at a minimum, a ‘durable’ remedy means a remedy that gives the 
Court confidence that defendants will not resume their violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights once judicial oversight ends.”). 
 182.  See, e.g., Welling & Jones, supra note 146, at 888 (“If an injunction is no longer 
necessary to deter future noncompliance, it stands only as a punishment for past transgressions 
and should be dissolved. Alternatively, if the injunction is still deterring noncompliance, it 
should be continued.”). 
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2. Truly Flexible Rule 60(b) Relief 
From the earliest days of institutional reform litigation, judges 
and scholars understood that institutional reform injunctions needed 
to be flexible and adaptable in order to achieve their goals.183 They 
recognized that the best efforts of parties and judges to create an 
effective remedy could be undermined by changes in circumstances.184 
Thus, the parties and judges involved in institutional reform litigation 
must be able to revisit and revise the injunctions to ensure that the 
remedies remain in sync with current realities. Modifications could 
respond to developments that render prior remedial steps ineffective, 
unduly burdensome, or counterproductive in ways that were 
unanticipated when the injunction was originally designed. 
Rule 60(b) provides the natural mechanism for adapting and 
adjusting institutional reform injunctions. As discussed above, under 
Rule 60(b) a party may ask a court to modify or terminate an 
injunction in certain situations, including when there has been “a 
significant change either in factual conditions or in law”185 that 
renders continued enforcement of the injunction “no longer 
 
 183.  See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 381 (1992) (“The experience 
of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals in implementing and modifying such decrees has 
demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to achieving the goals of reform 
litigation.”); Sys. Fed’n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (“There is . . . no dispute but 
that a sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of the terms of an injunctive decree 
if the circumstances, whether of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have changed, 
or new ones have since arisen.”); N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 
956, 970 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing need for a flexible modification standard for institutional 
reform injunctions); Phila. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1119–21 (3d Cir. 1979).  
 As Professor Owen Fiss has explained: 
The judge must search for the “best” remedy, but since his judgment must incorporate 
such open-ended considerations as effectiveness and fairness, and since the threat and 
constitutional value that occasions the intervention can never be defined with great 
precision, the intervention can never be defended with any certitude. It must always be 
open to revision . . . . 
Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 3, at 49. 
 184.  See, e.g., Jost, supra note 123, at 1103 (“Because the injunction is necessarily a static, 
presentiated response to a dynamic evolving problem, over time it almost inevitably becomes less 
responsive to the problem it addresses.”); see also Rufo, 502 U.S. at 403 n.2 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“It is the difficulty in determining prospectively which remedy is best that justifies a 
flexible standard of modification.”). The Court has also noted the need for modification of 
injunctions in cases that do not involve institutional reform. See, e.g., Sys. Fed’n No. 91, 364 U.S. 
at 647 (observing that “an injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court 
and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who 
obtained that equitable relief”). 
 185.  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384; accord Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009). 
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equitable.”186 For institutional reform injunctions that remain in place 
for many years, such changes are common. While some changes 
render the injunction obsolete or unnecessary,187 others call for the 
injunction to be updated rather than discarded. Thus, it would seem 
that both plaintiffs and defendants in institutional reform litigation 
would have occasion to return to court seeking to modify injunctions 
that have fallen out of sync with the facts on the ground. 
Yet Rule 60(b) has become something of a one-way ratchet, 
used almost exclusively by defendants to weaken or dissolve 
institutional reform injunctions. This is not surprising, as Supreme 
Court decisions since the early 1990s have made it easier for 
defendants to escape their obligations under the injunctions.188 As a 
result, defendants increasingly have sought to free themselves from 
court oversight by challenging injunctions that have been in place for 
years, while plaintiffs have assumed a defensive posture, fighting to 
preserve the injunctions they previously won.189 
It does not need to be this way. Just because an institutional 
reform injunction has been affected by changed circumstances does 
not mean that the only response is to weaken or dissolve the 
injunction.190 Lower courts have broad power to modify injunctions.191 
As the Supreme Court explained in Rufo, “[T]he focus should be on 
whether the proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems 
created by the change in circumstances.”192 And even when changed 
circumstances render aspects of an injunction unnecessary or 
 
 186.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). As the Supreme Court has explained, “The Rule encompasses 
the traditional power of a court of equity to modify its decree in light of changed circumstances.” 
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004). 
 187.  See, e.g., Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. 
Wisconsin, 769 F.3d 543, 548 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (“[I]n the case of regulatory decrees, . . . 
often the passage of time renders them obsolete, so that the case for modification or rescission 
actually grows with time, as in Horne v. Flores . . . .”). 
 188.  See Horne, 557 U.S. 433; Rufo, 502 U.S. 367; Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); see also supra Part II.A (discussing dissolution of institutional 
reform injunctions). 
 189.  See supra Part II.A. 
 190.  Cf. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391 (warning that Rule 60(b) should not be used “to rewrite a 
consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor”). 
 191.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cty., 712 F.3d 761, 767 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]hough a court cannot randomly expand or 
contract the terms agreed upon in a consent decree, judicial discretion in flexing its supervisory 
and enforcement muscles is broad.” (quoting Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 278 F.3d 64, 80 (2d 
Cir. 2002))). 
 192.  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391. 
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inequitable, courts can dissolve those parts while leaving the rest of 
the injunction in place.193 
In addition, Rule 60(b) relief is not limited to defendants in 
institutional reform litigation. To be sure, the Supreme Court 
decisions applying Rule 60(b) in this context have involved motions 
made by defendants rather than plaintiffs.194 However, even in those 
decisions the Court has been careful to describe Rule 60(b) relief as 
available to “a party” and not just a defendant.195 Indeed, plaintiffs 
have a long history of invoking Rule 60(b) in institutional reform 
litigation196 as well as more traditional litigation.197 Regardless of the 
context, courts have recognized that modification is appropriate when 
changes are necessary to achieve the goal of the injunction.198 
Taking a more expansive view of Rule 60(b) relief can help 
ensure that institutional reform injunctions are not undermined by 
changing circumstances.199 Modification can be necessary when, due to 
 
 193.  See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490–91 (1992) (holding “that, in the course of 
supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and 
control of school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in 
every area of school operations”).  
 194.  See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009); Rufo, 502 U.S. 367; Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City 
Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).  
 195.  See, e.g., Horne, 557 U.S. at 447 (“Rule [60(b)] provides a means by which a party can 
ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if ‘a significant change either in factual 
conditions or in law’ renders continued enforcement ‘detrimental to the public interest.’ ” 
(citation omitted)); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 441 (2004) (“Rule 60(b)(5) allows a party to 
move for relief if ‘it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application.’ ”); Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383 (“[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree bears 
the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the 
decree.”); see also David C. v. Leavitt, 242 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that “nothing 
in Rufo limits its application to cases in which modification is sought by the defendant party”). 
 196.  See, e.g., David C., 242 F.3d at 1212–13 (applying Rufo in a case where modification 
was sought by the plaintiff party); Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 131–32 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(same); Juan F. v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874, 879 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Vanguards of Cleveland v. 
City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 197.  See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968) (holding that 
plaintiff could seek modification of an injunction where the injunction had failed to achieve its 
desired result); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, No. 2:06–CV–896, 2013 WL 4008758 
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2013). 
 198.  See United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. at 251 (observing that when “the decree has not, 
after 10 years, achieved its ‘principal objects,’ . . . the time has come to prescribe other, and if 
necessary more definitive, means to achieve the result”); see also Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037, 
1063–64 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that changed circumstances and failure to achieve the 
decree’s aims both may warrant decree modification); Police Ass’n of New Orleans ex rel. 
Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1996) (“It is settled that, to the 
extent a decree is drafted to deal with events in the future, the court must remain continually 
willing to modify the order to ensure that it accomplishes its intended result.”). 
 199.  See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381 (“The experience of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals 
in implementing and modifying such decrees has demonstrated that a flexible approach is often 
essential to achieving the goals of reform litigation.”); see also United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 
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changed circumstances, an injunction’s remedial provisions are no 
longer able to prevent a defendant’s unlawful conduct. This can occur 
when violations continue despite a defendant’s compliance with an 
injunction’s remedial steps, or when a defendant is wasting time and 
resources implementing provisions that have become unnecessary due 
to new facts and circumstances. For example, advances in technology 
may create opportunities for a defendant to comply with its legal 
obligations in more efficient or less burdensome ways, but the 
injunction mandates actions that have become inefficient or unduly 
burdensome. While district courts do not have limitless discretion 
when altering a defendant’s obligations under an existing 
injunction,200 using Rule 60(b) to do more than weaken or dissolve 
institutional reform injunctions can be “essential to achieving the 
goals of reform litigation.”201 
A truly flexible approach to Rule 60(b) relief can also help 
assuage the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Horne v. 
Flores.202 If, as the Court worried, an institutional reform injunction 
“locks in” a remedial approach that is later shown to be ineffective, 
inefficient, or unduly burdensome,203 the response need not be 
dissolution of the injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b). Instead, a district 
court could modify the injunction so that it incorporates the types of 
“new insights and solutions” that the Court feared would otherwise be 
precluded by the injunction.204 Similarly, if an institutional reform 
injunction is found to violate federalism principles as discussed in 
Horne,205 Rule 60(b) relief could result in modifications that respond to 
such concerns. For example, an injunction that uses a command-and-
control approach to reforming an institution could be adjusted so that 
the defendant possesses more discretion and flexibility to remedy the 
unlawful conduct in ways that it sees fit.206 
To be sure, exposing institutional reform injunctions to more 
frequent judicial scrutiny creates risks for both plaintiffs and 
 
at 251–52 (1968) (“If the decree has not . . . achieved its principal objects . . . the time has come to 
prescribe other, and if necessary more definitive, means to achieve the result.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 200.  See, e.g., Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389 (highlighting the importance of preserving “the finality 
of [consent decrees]”). 
 201.  Id. at 381. 
 202.  See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447–50 (2009) (discussing reasons for a flexible 
approach to Rule 60(b) motions seeking to modify or terminate institutional reform injunctions).  
 203.  Id. at 449. 
 204.  Id. (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 442). 
 205.  See id. at 448. 
 206.  See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1082–93 (discussing how an experimentalist 
approach to institutional reform injunctions relates to areas of doctrinal controversy). 
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defendants. From the plaintiffs’ perspective, a higher frequency of 
Rule 60(b) motions may increase the number of injunctions that are 
weakened or dissolved in response to the motions. But when the 
alternative is to leave in place injunctions that are increasingly 
ineffective and susceptible to death by dissolution or by disuse, it is 
not clear that the plaintiffs have much to lose. Similarly, from the 
defendant’s perspective, more frequent modification can introduce 
considerable uncertainty into its obligations under the injunction. 
However, to the extent that this results in injunctions that are 
updated to reflect current circumstances, it may be a worthwhile 
tradeoff. 
3. Identification of Aging Injunctions 
Premature death of institutional reform injunctions can also be 
avoided by identifying the injunctions before it is too late. After all, 
awareness of an injunction’s existence is the first step toward 
ensuring that it does not inappropriately fall into disuse. Yet even 
though institutional reform injunctions are court orders, simply 
identifying the injunctions that are currently in effect is exceedingly 
difficult. A few are published in the Federal Supplement or in 
electronic databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, but the vast majority 
are not.207 Injunctions that were issued since 2001 may be included in 
the federal courts’ electronic database of court filings (entitled “Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records” or “PACER”);208 however, due to 
the limitations of PACER’s interface, one cannot use PACER to find 
an injunction without first knowing of its existence.209 And PACER 
does not contain most injunctions issued prior to 2001.210 Thus, as 
 
 207.  See Schlanger, supra note 99, at 516 (“Injunctions are court orders, so one might think 
that they would be embodied in court opinions, which are accessible to and searchable by, most 
prominently, subscribers of Westlaw or Lexis. Think again.”); Schlanger, supra note 27, at 570 
(observing that because institutional reform lawsuits “are likely to settle, they may well not lead 
to any judicial decisions at all, but rather to negotiated court orders that are completely 
unobservable by ordinary case research methods”). 
 208.  See PACER: Public Access to Court Electronic Records, U.S. COURTS, http://www.pacer 
.gov (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/X8RH-CPSR]. 
 209.  See Schlanger, supra note 99, at 520–21 (explaining that someone trying to locate a 
specific injunction must know the court and either the defendant name or case docket number). 
This may be changing, as Bloomberg Law, a subscription-based service for online legal research 
launched in 2010, enables users to search federal-court dockets and court filings that were 
previously accessible only through PACER. See BLOOMBERG LAW, http://www.bloomberglaw.com 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/T5M9-QUAD]. 
 210.  In fact, “even now, some district courts digitize very little more than the docket sheet 
itself, and such incomplete digitization used to be far more prevalent.” Schlanger, supra note 99, 
at 521. 
          
214 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:167 
Professor Margo Schlanger has observed, “[N]otwithstanding the 
individual and collective importance of all these injunctions, they 
languish in practical obscurity, unavailable to all but the 
extraordinarily persevering researcher who joins inside information 
with abundant funds.”211 
Recent efforts have been made to catalogue institutional reform 
injunctions, but more must be done. The Civil Rights Litigation 
Clearinghouse is doing heroic work logging and making available 
institutional reform injunctions on its website; however, it is not 
comprehensive.212 Given that the courts maintain jurisdiction over the 
injunctions, they have both a substantial interest in keeping track of 
their orders and the capacity to do so.213 And with respect to future 
injunctions, the federal courts could modify PACER so that orders 
with prospective effect are tagged and, at the very least, judges are 
aware of injunctions that remain in force. 
C. Ensuring Appropriate Death of Future Injunctions 
The previous Section offered recommendations aimed at 
preventing institutional reform injunctions that are currently in place 
from terminating before their goals are achieved. This Section, in 
contrast, turns to injunctions that have yet to be written and offers 
ideas for how future injunctions can be designed so that they do not 
terminate prematurely. 
Designers of institutional reform injunctions cannot assume 
that the injunction will remain in force indefinitely. Truly permanent 
injunctions are increasingly unavailable to institutional reform 
plaintiffs, whether because many institutional reform defendants now 
refuse to enter into consent decrees without sunset provisions, or 
because of the Supreme Court’s apparent preference for ending federal 
court involvement in institutional reform at the earliest possible 
date.214 Thus, new injunctions should address two related questions, 
 
 211.  Id. at 515. 
 212.  See Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.clearinghouse 
.net (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6UAB-24JW]. As of November 14, 2016, “the 
Clearinghouse is posting at least partial information on 6,794 cases, including a litigation 
summary for each, as well as 49,676 dockets, complaints, filings, opinions, settlements, court 
orders, and other documents.” What is the Clearinghouse?, Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 
U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.clearinghouse.net/about.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/6AYK-ANF7]. 
 213.  But cf. Schlanger, supra note 99, at 521 (“There is no hope of getting the information 
from the courts, which do not index their lawsuits except by a few variables, all of which are 
irrelevant here.”). 
 214.  See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009). 
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namely what should trigger the injunction’s termination, and how the 
parties and the court will know when the triggering event has 
occurred. In response to these questions, this Section recommends 
termination clauses based on the defendant’s performance, paired 
with monitoring and reporting obligations that measure the 
defendant’s performance with precision and accuracy. These features 
are not unfamiliar to institutional reform litigation; however, based on 
the experience of injunction death discussed in Part II, as well as 
important new technological developments, there are now ways to 
improve the design of injunctions so that they do not terminate 
prematurely. 
1. Performance-Based Termination Clauses 
Termination clauses are now commonly included in 
institutional reform injunctions, either because the defendant 
negotiating a consent decree demands it, or because the judge issuing 
the injunction includes it. But not all termination clauses are the 
same, and the differences can have a significant effect on whether the 
goals of the injunction are achieved. Thus, when considering how to 
ensure that new institutional reform injunctions do not die 
prematurely, it is essential to focus on the design of the termination 
clause. 
Merely referring to performance of certain remedial tasks is 
not necessarily sufficient to ensure that the goals of the injunction are 
met. The termination provision may also need to specify that 
termination is appropriate only upon a showing that the targeted legal 
violations have ended. This may seem like a distinction without a 
difference—after all, if a defendant has dutifully implemented the 
injunction’s action items, it would seem to be in full compliance and 
termination would be appropriate under a performance-based theory 
of termination. However, just because a defendant takes the actions 
mandated by an injunction does not mean that the underlying 
unlawful conduct has been eradicated. Foresight is limited, especially 
as it relates to reforming complex government institutions that are 
subject to ever-changing circumstances.215 Indeed, this is what creates 
the need for the types of modifications available pursuant to Rule 
60(b).216 
 
 215.  See, e.g., Jost, supra note 123, at 1102 (describing the “baffling perplexities” that courts 
encounter when they attempt to envision the future in institutional reform litigation). 
 216.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
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The distinction between a defendant’s compliance with an 
injunction and its compliance with the law has been held to be 
dispositive by at least one court since the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Horne v. Flores refined the Rule 60(b) analysis. In a recent decision by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court ruled that the 
district court erroneously denied a motion to terminate an 
institutional reform injunction even though the defendant had not 
established that it was in compliance with the law.217 According to the 
Fifth Circuit, because the defendant had undertaken the various 
action items specified by the sunset clause—and because the clause 
did not refer to the defendant’s actual compliance with the law—
termination was required despite the existence of ongoing legal 
violations.218 Although the Fifth Circuit’s view of sunset clauses may 
be an outlier,219 it is nonetheless a reminder that performance-based 
termination provisions must be linked to compliance with the law in 
order to ensure that the injunction is not terminated prematurely. 
In addition to performance-based triggers, termination 
provisions should require some showing that the defendant’s lawful 
conduct is not merely a temporary or one-time-only occurrence. 
Without such a durability requirement, a defendant would be able to 
seek termination immediately upon satisfying the injunction’s 
performance goals. Yet for cases involving institutional reform, a 
defendant’s ability to comply with its legal obligations at one point in 
time does not necessarily establish that the unlawful policies and 
practices that gave rise to the litigation have been truly reformed. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this aspect of institutional 
reform litigation in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 
when it ruled that dissolution of a school desegregation injunction was 
appropriate when the district court found that the school board had 
complied with the law for “a reasonable period of time” and that it was 
 
 217.  See Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 218.  See id. at 329–30.  
 219.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, appears to have taken a different approach to 
terminating institutional reform injunctions in accordance with the injunction’s sunset clause. 
See Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that compliance with the injunction’s 
action items alone was not a sufficient basis for dissolving the decree). According to the Ninth 
Circuit, “Explicit consideration of the goals of the [injunction], and whether those goals have 
been adequately served, must be part of the determination to vacate the consent decrees.” Id. at 
289. But cf. Frew, 780 F.3d at 329–30 (noting that the sunset clause at issue in Jeff D. provided 
that the decree would remain in force until, inter alia, “[the district court was] satisfied by 
stipulation or otherwise that the claims as alleged in the Complaint have been adequately 
addressed” (quoting Jeff D., 643 F.3d at 281)).  
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“unlikely that the school board would return to its former ways.”220 
Thus, by requiring a defendant to establish the durability of its 
compliance, a performance-based termination clause can increase the 
likelihood that the injunction remains in effect long enough to achieve 
its goals. 
2. Monitoring and Reporting Obligations 
It is not enough for an institutional reform injunction to link 
termination to the defendant’s satisfaction of well-designed 
performance goals. For a performance-based termination provision to 
operate as intended, the parties and the court must be able to 
determine the extent to which those goals have been met. Because 
institutional reform defendants do not typically gather and publicize 
information about their inner workings,221 it is up to the injunction to 
specify how the defendant’s performance will be monitored and what 
its reporting obligations (to the plaintiffs and to the court) will be. 
Thus, performance-based termination criteria must be paired with 
monitoring and reporting obligations that specify the data that the 
defendant is required to gather and how frequently and to whom it 
must be disclosed.222 
Although monitoring and reporting have long been features of 
institutional reform injunctions, changes in technology have created 
new opportunities for the generation of more accurate and complete 
 
 220.  Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–48 (1991); see also id. 
at 247 (explaining that a finding that the defendant was operating in compliance with the law 
and that it was unlikely that the violations would resume, “would be a finding that the purposes 
of the . . . litigation had been fully achieved”); cf. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 
367, 390 (1992) (explaining, in the context of consent decrees, that the legally enforceable 
obligations are “not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements”).  
 Although the Court’s decision in Horne v. Flores was contradictory on this aspect of 
institutional reform remedies, Horne did not overrule any of the Court’s prior decisions touching 
on this issue. Compare Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009) (“If a durable remedy has been 
implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.” 
(emphasis added)), with id. at 450 (“A flexible approach [to the Rule 60(b) analysis] allows courts 
to ensure that ‘responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the 
State and its officials’ when the circumstances warrant.” (quoting Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 
442 (2004) (emphasis added))), and id. at 451 (criticizing the lower court for failing to “appl[y] a 
flexible standard that seeks to return control to state and local officials as soon as a violation of 
federal law has been remedied” (emphasis added)).  
 221.  This is not always true. In some contexts, the government agencies involved in 
institutional reform litigation disclose information about their compliance with the law as a 
matter of course.  
 222.  Cf. Margo Schlanger & Pauline Kim, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
and Structural Reform of the American Workplace, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1519, 1577–78 (2014) 
(discussing the importance of data generation and data sharing when seeking to hold defendants 
accountable for compliance with an institutional reform remedy).  
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data about a defendant’s performance. For one thing, technological 
developments have dramatically reduced the burden of gathering and 
analyzing many types of data that are at issue in institutional reform 
cases. In cases involving agency processing or adjudication, relevant 
information is increasingly digitized and maintained in vast electronic 
databases.223 While in prior years a government defendant would have 
gathered that information by retrieving paper case files and 
photocopying individual documents, today the information can be 
made available and analyzed with the push of a few buttons.224 
In addition to reducing the burden of monitoring and reporting 
obligations, technological developments can open up new possibilities 
for designing performance-based termination provisions. Aware of 
government defendants’ growing capacity to disclose increasingly 
detailed and accurate compliance data, the parties and the court can 
design performance-based termination provisions that are more 
targeted and nuanced than were possible in previous years.225 In 
addition, the rise of electronic databases enables more frequent 
reporting: no longer are monitoring and reporting obligations 
necessarily confined to monthly, quarterly, or annual disclosures, as 
real-time or rolling production of performance data is increasingly 
possible.226 
Requiring institutional reform defendants to undertake the 
types of enhanced monitoring and reporting obligations discussed in 
this Section should not raise concerns under Horne v. Flores. The 
Horne Court questioned the appropriateness of federal courts 
dictating the policies and procedures of state and local institutions.227 
Monitoring and reporting obligations, in contrast, do not intrude on 
the defendant’s authority to operate as it sees fit and should not 
trigger the same type of scrutiny. 
In fact, taking advantage of these technological developments 
can help institutional reform injunctions avoid some of the concerns 
raised in Horne.228 For example, more detailed information about the 
implementation of an institutional reform injunction can enable 
district courts to make better-informed assessments of whether the 
injunction is still necessary to remedy the defendant’s unlawful 
 
 223.  Cf. Jason Parkin, Due Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 314–18 
(2014). 
 224.  See id. 
 225.  Designing effective performance metrics remains challenging, however. See, e.g., 
LIPSKY, supra note 144, at 40–53; WILSON, supra note 144, at 154–78. 
 226.  See Parkin, supra note 223, at 314–18.  
 227.  See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448–50 (2009). 
 228.  Id. at 447–50. 
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actions.229 Such disclosures also help the parties and the court assess 
whether another concern raised in Horne—the impact of changed 
circumstances230—may require that the injunction be modified or 
terminated. Thus, knowing more about how a defendant is 
implementing an injunction is important not just for measuring the 
defendant’s performance, but also for ensuring that as time passes the 
injunction does not run afoul of Horne. 
Lastly, the information generated by an injunction’s 
monitoring and reporting obligations is arguably more valuable today 
that at any point during the history of institutional reform litigation. 
The shift from command-and-control injunctions to experimentalist 
regimes means that it is essential for the parties and the court to 
know which remedial actions are working and which are not.231 In 
addition, in a world in which Rule 60(b) motions are more frequent, 
courts require detailed and accurate data to determine whether an 
injunction should be dissolved or modified. 
CONCLUSION 
Institutional reform litigation cannot succeed unless its 
remedies are both durable and adaptable. That is, the resulting 
injunctions must remain in place long enough to prompt meaningful 
systemic reform, and they must be flexible enough to account for 
changing facts and circumstances. Yet changes in the legal 
landscape—including, most significantly, the Supreme Court’s 
hostility toward aging institutional reform injunctions—have 
undermined the durability and flexibility of institutional reform 
injunctions. As a result, the injunctions are in danger of being 
terminated before their goals are achieved. 
It is not too late to correct course. Understanding the different 
ways that institutional reform injunctions are ending is a necessary 
first step. After all, whether the injunctions are dying by dissolution, 
by design, or by disuse has varying implications for the parties, 
lawyers, and judges involved in the litigation. From there, it is 
possible to identify strategies for avoiding premature termination of 
existing injunctions and for ensuring that future injunctions are 
 
 229.  See id. at 450 (“If a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of 
the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.”); see also United States v. Tennessee, 986 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 935 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (stating that “the Court cannot conclude that the State has 
a durable remedy in place to ensure class member safety without an adequate reporting system 
in place”). 
 230.  See Horne, 557 U.S. at 448. 
 231.  See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2. 
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terminated appropriately. These strategies will be essential to protect 
the legacy of institutional reform litigation and to ensure that aging 
institutional reform injunctions are more than dusty relics from a 
bygone era. 
 
